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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Tbi- K * mil has appellate jiu'isdictionovu liiumi iinit'i1. nl ihr I hinl f ii iiiiii ni
l ui I I I I HI II l i t i l I i l l I l i iiillli

ill I I I *''
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K1 ^ (

\)(\)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
ISSUE #1.

Under Utah law, what are the fiduciary duties between and

among shareholders, officers inn uimun's in a v u>>e corporal ;
STAN.

••

i HI •

nurt
1

Amdt

uw irom other junsdicticns lor guidance."

lust Interstate Bank of Utah N.A., I91»9 UT 91, % 17, 991 P.3d 548,

'

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: I\ M aughlin asked the trial coin t to
adopt the majority position on the Ian ol close COI|MII.IIIUIIS ,i( ( iL""( I1, J - A1 .JI
r*p ';
• .:

•

Defending' M<»tion for Summary

v itation, McLaughlin filed a Motion to Amend
. to Add Parties and Causes of Action J - r n 1 and A1574 again arguing

the existence of fiduciary di lty. The trial court d C l i ^-

1

i(11

n.uiu .. ,,

This case consists of three consolidal
u -jismci i umi v. u ^ . *« ^
040924997, 050914253 and 05090672--,
. .* inal court paginated the nv rd
for appeal, each case was numbered separately. Counsel and the clerk hau
agreed, that in liei I of repagination, all parties will cite to the record in this case as
follows:
1140924997 = Aletseq." .
050914253 - III et seq.
Ij:»ll()()(i72() . CI et seq.
1

ISSUE #2: Should McLaughlin have been permitted to amend his
complaint?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's ruling on a motion to amend
will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. GLFP, Ltd. v. CL Mgt.f
Ltd., 2007 UT App 131, f 26, 163 P.3d 636. "The discretion granted a trial court
to deny a motion to amend, however, must be tempered with the mandate of rule
15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that 'leave [to amend] shall be freely given
when justice so requires.'" Id. (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a)). "In Aurora Credit
Services, Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev.y Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998), the Utah
Supreme Court cited favorably the United States Supreme Court's caution that
'outright refusal to grant the leave [to amend] without any justifying reason
appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that
discretion and inconsistent with the spirit' of the rules of civil procedure." Id. at
127.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: McLaughlin moved to amend his
complaint at A1571 and A1574. McLaughlin's proposed Amended Complaint is
found at A1587. The trial court's ruling denying leave to amend is at A1735.
ISSUE #3: Was the 2005 ratification by Cookietree's Board and
shareholders "valid and effective" as a matter of law?

2

STAND\RD OF RhVlhW. Summary jinljL'innil is .ilfinin ,1 nily v-Jitu
'there is no gemii lie i SMI i1 v lo m\ niiiiciuil • >
.» a n d , ,

ilr moving party is

i til iticLJ I- A )ti(l(i»iiin i ,»•' i n.'ilter of law. " GLFP, 2007 UT App a t f 5 (citing
I Jtah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This court docs not grant the trial court's legal
conclusions any deference, reviewing them for correctness j .ai; .i m Ku,
reviewing a grant of summarx j u a^
reasonable tiifcieiiees dra >
i i o m i i o v iiijit I' ill r

uosi favorable to the

Id.

' •

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: Defendants moved for summary
judgment at A189 and McLaughlin opposed summary judgment al . WlM in '
A993. the nidi coini giaum ti I Vlnidani^ mon i i ' • 11 Since multiple
ai'li'i.'

• - -

:

•

" iudement were raised (A993),McLaughli '

asked foi a viuiiiicatiun ^ lo the exact basis of the ruling. Al 513 The Court.
declined to clarify at A173 5
III' II'KIM IN "1 Ii"1. I' I I1 IIIUIII IV
#

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(27) "Qualified shares" means, with respect iu a un
transaction pursuant to Section 16- 10a 853, anv sirtransaction, except shun--.

-*-.,!
4
i

(a) that, .. the km.-w sedge, before the vote, of the secretary, other officer, or
agent of the corporation authorized to tabi date votes, are beneficially owned; or

3

(b) the voting of which is controlled, by:
(i) a director who has a conflicting interest respecting the transaction;
(ii) a related person of that director; or
(iii) persons referred to in Subsections (27)(b)(i) and (ii).
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-850. Definitions relating to conflicting interest
transactions.
As used in Sections 16-10a-850 through 16-10a-853:
(1) "Conflicting interest" with respect to a corporation means the interest a
director has respecting a transaction effected or proposed to be effected by the
corporation or by any entity in which the corporation has a controlling interest if:
(a) whether or not the transaction is brought before the board of directors of the
corporation for action, the director knows at the time of commitment that the
director or a related person of the director is a party to the transaction or has a
beneficial financial interest in or is so closely linked to, the transaction and the
transaction is so financially significant to the director or a related person of the
director that the interest would reasonably be expected to exert an influence on the
director's judgment if the director were called upon to vote on the transaction; or
(b) the transaction is brought, or is of a character and significance to the
corporation that it would in the normal course be brought, before the board of
directors for action, and the director knows at the time of commitment that any of
the following persons is either a party to the transaction or has a beneficial
financial interest in, or is so closely linked to, the transaction and the transaction is
so financially significant to the person that the interest would reasonably be
expected to exert an influence on the director's judgment if the director were called
upon to vote on the transaction:
(i) an entity, other than the corporation, of which the director is a director,
general partner, agent, or employee or an entity to which the director owes a
fiduciary duty, other than a fiduciary duty arising because the director is a director
of the corporation;

4

i\\) an individual who is a general partner, p i.ici|/ai, or employer of the directoi
or who is a beneficiary of a fiduciarx <linv owed by ihe director, other thar
fiduciary duty arising becan^-* *l« '•• * •• * ••:-><>i ^ ^ ^ ^ n v r a i i M ;vi
. .iuuia UIK w moie o! the entities specified in Subsection
11 .,. j • ot dt
M v diat is controlled h\m o\ is IPKICI common control with, one or
more of the entities or individuals specified in Subsection 11 )(h)(n or (l)(b)(ii).
rn

) "Director's conflicting interest tran:
means a transa
roposed tu anyentitvci
w^;(.n <.>vTV
,*• , - p r

, , u . .»!JK I :.J n
•_* die corporation
• .. Hinvnu-h *

»

*; M "Qualified director" means, with tespeo !*>,. director's conflicting interest
transaction, any director who does not have either a conflicting interest respecting
the transaction, or a familial, financial, professional, or employment relationship
w ith a second director who does have a conflicting interest respecting the
transaction, which relationship would, in the circumstances, reasonably be
expected to exert a*" :-~'I* • - - ^" ih ' ' * u • ' - ^ judgment when voting on the
transa*K Hi..- jd disclosure" means disclosure by the director who has a
conflicting interest of
ii n'liillnlni}11 inii n ' I, ,u»d

; 'he existence an.: •

. - , an lacts KIIL . ..I. ihe director respecting the subject matter oi* the
transaction that an ordinarilv prudent person would reasonably believe to he
material tu a "idiMneni a? . .,-• u hethei ->; in*-! to proceed i\ ith ihe transaction,
/ N

^ < " T i m e oi LOiniliJliiiCin

- ^

. a lia;.

..;MIK

unit, wucn uiv

transaction is consummated or, if made pursuant ** ,. , ^ a , the time when the
corporation or the entity controlled by the corporation becomes contractual Is
obligated so that its unilateral withdrawal from the transaction would entail
significant loss, liability, or other damage.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851. Judicial action.
.uiion eitectcd or propu&eu ^. i . .:::ivku * :> a .
., .
entit) controucd by the corporation that is not a dnector's con
iieresi
u
transaction - - • ** < enjoined, be ci asiile or s^ive nse to an awaiu ui daiim^^

5

or other sanctions, in a proceeding by a shareholder or by or in the right of the
corporation, solely because a director, or any person with whom or which the
director has a personal, economic, or other association, has an interest in the
transaction.
(2) A director's conflicting interest transaction may not be enjoined, be set
aside, or give rise to an award of damages or other sanctions, in a proceeding by a
shareholder or by or in the right of the corporation, solely because the director, or
any person with whom or which the director has a personal, economic, or other
association, has an interest in the transaction, if:
(a) directors1 action respecting the transaction was at any time taken in
compliance with Section 16-10a-852;
(b) shareholders1 action respecting the transaction was at any time taken in
compliance with Section 16-1 Oa-853; or
(c) the transaction, judged according to the circumstances at the time of
commitment, is established to have been fair to the corporation.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-852. Directors' action.
(1) Directors' action respecting a transaction is taken for purposes of
Subsection 16-10a-851(2)(a) if the transaction received the affirmative vote of a
majority of those qualified directors on the board of directors or on a duly
empowered committee of the board who voted on the transaction after either
required disclosure to them, to the extent the information was not known by them,
or compliance with Subsection (2), provided that action by a committee is effective
under this subsection only if:
(a) all its members are qualified directors; and
(b) its members are either all of the qualified directors or are appointed by the
affirmative vote of a majority of the qualified directors.
(2) If a director has a conflicting interest respecting a transaction, but neither
the director nor a related person of the director is a party to the transaction, and if
the director has a duty under law or professional canon, or a duty of confidentiality
to another person, respecting information relating to the transaction so that the
director may not make the disclosure described in Section 16-10a-850(4)(b), then
disclosure is sufficient for purposes of Subsection (1) if the director discloses to the
6

directors voting on the transaction, before their \ ote, th i = :: dst = i i : i andnatui e of
the conflicting interest and informs them of the chara c te i and Hi nitations imposed
by that di lty.
,.:,. \ nidj
• - 4 the qualified directors on the board of directors or on the
committee, as the case may be, constitutes a quorum for purposes of action fm!
complies with this section. Directors' action that otherwise complies with :!u
section is not affected by the presence or vote of a d*recu>i u ho is not a quail \cd
director.
me Aim. $

*• "

I; shareholders' action respecting a transaction is citective for purposes of
Subsectioi. o i Oa-851 (2 )c b) if a quorum existed pursuant to Subsection (2) and a
majorifx of the \otes entitled io hi-, iv-: K holdcis of qualified shares present in
persot : ; \ pr->x\ at the meeting were cast in tavoi <)f the transaction after notice
to shareholders describing the directors conflicting interest transaction, provision
of the information referred to in Subsection (3). and required disclosure to the
shareholders \\\
' - J •*" *Ui% h i , K : v , t i ' ^ ^ ^ • r^^nt the information wa^ nut
known by th^-.2} A majorit) oi the \otes entitle 1 to be cast by the holders of all quali*:~J
shares constitutes a quorum for purposes of action that complies with this section.
Sub.ru to the provisions of Subsections (3) and (4), shareholders' action that
otherwise complies with this section is not affected by the presence of ho'--?- ••• -\
^ ,1:-' voting of. ^I'.'i* •- t ] -r :*-c r v4 nvalified shares,
' for purposes oi compliance wiii. Subsectioi. v : . director who ha^ a
,. f.Micting interest respecting the transaction shall, before the shareholders \ote
inform the secretary or other officer or agent oi the corporation authorized t
tabulate votes of the number and the identity o( persons holding or controlling
vote, of all shares that the director knows are beneficially owned, or the \oting ^i
l
which is controlled, by the directs
' n -.'l.r.vl t\-t- - -^f iUc ^—*-*- .,*- K ,»I.#
.. ,; shareholders \^w docs not compo . . Suhsection ( : »soleix because
oi a iiulure ol a director to comph -\ itli Subsection *3;, and if the directorestablishes that the failure did not determine and was not intended by hin- h »
influence the oukome of the vote, the court may, w ith i >A ithout further
proceedings undei Sui -s-. : >. -s 16-10a-851(2)(c), take ain action respecting the
transaction and the director, and give any effect to die shareholders1 vote, as it
considers appropriate in fUo circumstances.

7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Cookietree, Inc. is a close corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and

distribution of baked goods and cookies. McLaughlin was a vice-president,
employee and shareholder of Cookietree from 1992-2004 . McLaughlin's wife
was a human resources executive and shareholder from 1992-2007. Greg Schenk,
the best man at the McLaughlin's wedding, is the majority shareholder, president
and CEO of the company. Schenk's wife Gayle was a member of the board.
Another shareholder, Harold Rosemann serves as the third board member and the
company's chief financial officer.
The facts in this case set forth a classic corporate freeze out. In 2004 a
dispute developed between McLaughlin and Schenk over several issues:
*

Schenk wanted to sell Cookietree to a strategic buyer3.

*

McLaughlin wanted to himself buy Cookietree and exercise his rights

of first refusal under the 1999 Shareholder Agreement.
*

McLaughlin discovered, and challenged, Schenk's secret acquisition

of additional Cookietree shares from his father's widow in 1999 claiming the
McLaughlin and his wife remain shareholders, as there is no viable market for
their shares.
3

A strategic buyer is willing to pay more for a business because the new business
enhances the buyer's current or exiting business.
8

transaction violated a then-effective 1991 Shareholder's Agreemeril

I hr,

acquisition secured Schenk s majnni', 11 nhnl ol ill mihnii/ed shines in the
company.

• ''

' .

Mil ;mghlin, in a series of challenges and requests, asserted his shareholder
rights in the corporation I: formation was

"l1.1 V Schenk rehired to consider

McLaughlin's offers to bvv the companv. Un, ..,

,.

...._.-

from meetings anu >.J i
w 111)< 11 * i vv In,'.

<.
' J

- - • • • •! ' • >e some changes around here. *'

Meanwhile, Schenk signed Letters of Intent with the strategic buyer, Tn •
correspondence with the bi Iyer and with Cookietree's own consultant,

find a
i

•
-

' •

'

mi. In an August, 2007

iver, Schenk was asked to "let me kne v\ d you make any progress

with Sam" [McLaughlin]. Schenk was particularly angry that the 1999 transaction
had been ;rr—iicd ano L ituiicii^LU ^ecause, irrational I;,, he considered Ins
deceased .,

'
veiled effort to place McLaughlin (a lather, of six, four under the

age of 7) in a position of economic hardship so that he would drop his claims and
cooperate, ^ :enls fired McLaughlin without cause ano v.,ii,uui a in,,mess
purpose. Even though Hv.au^m..,

*-.;,,., .
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McLaughlin was entitled to six months notice of termination, Schenk had him
removed from Cookietree property by police and trespassed from the premises.
Schenk cut McLaughlin's severance to 1992 levels. McLaughlin was rather
literally "out on the street."
In the following days, Schenk and his lawyers approached McLaughlin for a
"global resolution" which would purportedly resolve the employment issues
together with the stock issues. McLaughlin declined and sued. Defendants then
conspired to ratify prior bad actions, even though the ratification was fraught with
illegality, conflict and interest.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
McLaughlin first filed a Complaint in November 2004 against Cookietree,

Inc. and Greg Schenk, its majority shareholder. Al (Third District Court Case No.
040924997; hereinafter "the stock action.") This action challenged a surreptitious
transfer of stock to Greg Schenk from his father's widow in violation of the 1991
Shareholder's Agreement. McLaughlin pled a breach of contract claim (A8) and
breach of fiduciary duty (A 12). In an after-the-fact attempt to legitimize the acts
complained about in McLaughlin's Complaint, litigation counsel procured
"waivers" from Cookietree's Board of Directors and some of its shareholders.
A227; A230 Defendants then brought a motion for summary judgment claiming
the stock transaction in question had been "ratified." A189
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In M a r c h , 2 0 0 5 McLaughlin filed a separate action stemi :i il t lg fi: 01 i 1 breaches
ol Kit Laiigliltn s Lmplo^inenl A g i m n u i l n i l l i l uuluetici, In

I I I I I i ni id

Di'.likl ( (»uil ( \ i s e f In I)S()<)067?0; hrnMtinflcr "the? employment action.

}

m^

Complaint in the employment action alleged, among other claims, a breach of .
fiduciary duty against Schenk. C35 Cookietrec and Schenk immediately filed a
Motinr \? Dismiss arguing thai .viicim wm iot owe Mc

mn any fiduciary

( Ii
A ,

^

A645 v , u ^

i

kietree "1'ouiiu and asserted an arbitration agreement.

ly, certain of McLaughli""N ci iploymenl laims" were referred to

arbitration. A867 The arbitration and the arbitrated <. iciuns are not a direct part of
lins uppi,

.v KKX> .4,t;;.'i?;. ii..

d
. ,f <J hvssed in arbitration.

.• '

\ 1 ^22-1623 Ilicrcioic, ihc matter v\a^ rebneied. A123b, A127U
McLaughlin also filed a derivative action w hich was similarly consolidated.
into the above litigation. Bl and ASK I ( I hird Dish id l ouit Case Nu (I • I IN I I "' . ',
heieiiiiiltci IIII'IK i h n .illiu" .n linn
IXIIIi I . a i i L ' l i l i i f

i I In "a linn ( niiipLiinh lornied the Icr r < I

iliiiiiis.
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While M c L a u g h l i n does not directly challenge the trial court's order referring
certain claims to arbitration < A867) oi <is later pi!i; c declining to set aside t h e
arbitration award i A !" >hh McLaughlu.. i^ chalh - ^ m g -he compailmentalization of
his claims (\<v p 55 infra) and appeals from the entire judgment " 174ifl
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While the motion for summary judgment on the ratification issue was
pending, Cookietree also filed the second motion for summary judgment on the
fiduciary duty issue. A1236 While both were pled, the issue of whether
McLaughlin's claims were direct or derivative was never litigated. The trial court
ruled on both motions for summary judgment at A1504.
The trial court made several errors in its ruling. The decision found that "all
of the causes of action in [the employment action, including, by implication the
breach of fiduciary duty claim against Greg Schenk individually] arose from the
employment relationship." A1506 The trial court found that Greg "Schenk did not
owe any fiduciary duty to Mr. McLaughlin that applies to the dealings related to
Mr. McLaughlin in his role as an employee." Id. The trial court found that
Cookietree, not Greg Schenk, fired McLaughlin, and found that Schenk's "role as
officer of the [close] corporation d[id] not create any new fiduciary relationship to
Mr. McLaughlin." A1506-1607 The ruling stated that "[f]or a fiduciary duty
claim to be present in this case, plaintiff would need to identify a duty, breach and
damages, separate from any of the contractual obligations that existed between the
parties." A1508-1509
The same ruling disposed of the motion for summary judgment on the
ratification issue by stating that "the 2005 waiver and ratification issues were
effective as a matter of law." A1508 Regarding this statement, McLaughlin filed
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a timely Motion to Amend Ruling and Order (A1513; A1518) asking for findings
of fact and an analysis or clarification of which of the many bases submitted in
opposition to the ratification the court was rejecting. The trial court declined to
clarify at A1535.
Availing himself of the opportunity left open by the trial court to "identify a
duty, breach and damages separate from any of the contractual obligations that
existed between the parties" McLaughlin filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint
to Add Parties and Causes of Action at A1571 articulating each of these categories.
A1574 McLaughlin filed a proposed Amended Complaint at A1587. The trial
court denied the motion and analysis at A1736 rejecting the "request [... to]
allow amendment of [the] complaint [to] address an alleged tort based fiduciary
duty that arose between the shareholders of this closely held corporation." A1737
C.

Statement of Facts
This entire case was disposed of on summary judgment below. This Court

views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to McLaughlin. GLFP, Ltd. v. CL Mgt, Ltd., 2007 UT App 131,15, 163
P.3d 636.
1.

Cookietree, Inc. ("Cookietree") was organized under Utah law in

1981. A1590 In 1991 Cookietree authorized 5,000,000 shares of common stock.
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A1022; A1023 Its original shareholders were Boyd Schenk, Greg Schenk, and
Lonnie Adams. A203; A1368
2.

In addition to owning shares, Greg Schenk has been the President and

CEO of Cookietree at all times relevant to this proceeding. A203 The other
Cookietree Board members were Gayle Schenk, Greg's wife, and Harold
Rosemann, the company's chief financial officer. A1089; A1141
3.

Harold Rosemann is also a shareholder of Cookietree and has been

since 1991. A1368
4.

In 1990 Cookietree adopted Bylaws which state in relevant part:

a.
Written or printed notice [of meetings] stating the place,
day and hour . . . and in the case of a special meeting, the purpose or
purposes for which the meeting is called, shall be delivered not less
than ten (10) nor more than fifty (50) days before the meeting, either
personally or by mail... to each shareholder of meeting." A1033
b.
"Any action required to be taken at a meeting of the
shareholders, or any other action which may be taken at a meeting of
the shareholders, may be taken without a meeting if a consent in
writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall be signed by all of the
shareholders entitled to vote with respect to the subject matter
thereof." A1036-1037
5.

On January 28, 1991 the shareholders of Cookietree, including both

Schenks, entered into a Shareholders Agreement ("1991 Shareholders Agreement")
which placed restrictions on the sale or transfer of Cookietree stock. A207
Specifically, the Shareholder's Agreement provides:
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1. No Shareholder shall sell, assign, pledge or in any manner
transfer any shares of Cookietree Common Stock now held or
hereafter acquired by him (the "Shares") or any right or interest
therein, whether voluntarily or by operation of law, or by gift or
otherwise, except by a transaction which meets the requirements
hereinafter set forth in this Agreement.
2. If any Shareholder desires or is required to sell any Shares,
or if any Shares would be transferred by operation of law or
otherwise, then the Shareholder (or his successor in interest shall first
offer the Shares to Cookietree, by written notice to Cookietree. The
notice shall state the number of Shares proposed to be transferred.

4. In the event Cookietree does not elect to acquire all of the
Shares specified in the selling Shareholder's notice, the Secretary of
Cookietree shall, within thirty (30) days of receipt of a selling
Shareholder's notice, give written notice thereof to the Shareholders
other than the selling Shareholder. Said written notice shall state the
number of Shares available for purchase (which shall be the same as
the number contained in the selling Shareholder's notice, less the
number of such Shares that Cookietree has elected to purchase). Each
of the other Shareholders shall be entitled to purchase that proportion
of the Shares available for purchase as the number of shares owned by
each of such other Shareholders bears to the total number of Shares
owned by all of such other Shareholders.

11. The provisions of this Agreement may be waived with
respect to any transfer either by Cookietree, upon duly authorized
action of its Board of Directors, or by the Shareholders, upon the
express written consent of the owners of at least two-thirds of the
Shares then subject to this Agreement (excluding those Shares owned
by the selling Shareholder).
12. Any sale or transfer, or purported sale or transfer, of
Cookietree Shares shall be null and void unless the terms, conditions,
and provisions of this Agreement are strictly observed and followed.
15

13. This Agreement shall expire ten years after its effective
dates, unless otherwise extended or earlier terminated by the parties as
provided herein.
A207;A208;A211
6.

On or about March 9, 1991, Boyd Schenk was issued stock certificate

#11 representing 1,363,200 shares of Cookietree common stock. A1368 On or
about the same date, Greg Schenk was issued stock certificate #10 representing
1,363,200 shares of Cookietree common stock. A1368
7.

Prior to 1992, McLaughlin worked in the food industry with positions

at Pillsbury and Quaker Oats and had 16 years experience. A266 A "head hunter"
or executive recruiter contacted McLaughlin on behalf of Cookietree and terms of
employment were negotiated. Id. The parties executed a written Employment
Agreement on or about December 14, 1992. A257
8.

Cookietree and McLaughlin negotiated a reciprocal notice

requirement should one party wish to terminate the employment relationship.
A257;A1274 This term was material to the agreement. A1274 McLaughlin was
contractually entitled to six-months notice of termination without cause. A259
His employment was at-will. Id.
9.

The Employment Agreement provided McLaughlin with stock options

allowing McLaughlin to acquire up to 200,000 shares of Cookietree common
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stock. A258 The Employment Agreement noted that the shares "would be
'restricted securities' . . . and subject to various restrictions on transfer." Id.
10.

McLaughlin was soon promoted to "Vice President of Operations"

and later "Chief Operating Officer and Vice President of Operations." A267
11.

While at Cookietree, McLaughlin answered directly to Greg Schenk.

A1277 McLaughlin never received any reprimand from Schenk nor did Schenk
ever discuss any performance concern or alleged performance concern with
McLaughlin. Id. Indeed, over McLaughlin's twelve years at Cookietree,
McLaughlin and Schenk were friends. Id. Schenk was the best man at
McLaughlin's wedding and Schenk often referred to McLaughlin as his "partner."
Id.
12.

At all relevant times, McLaughlin was married to another Cookietree

executive and shareholder, Kim McLaughlin. A1293
13.

Later, in 1993, Cookietree and McLaughlin entered into an Incentive

Stock Option Agreement defining McLaughlin's option to purchase 200,000 shares
of Cookietree common stock. This Agreement provided that "upon exercise of any
options granted herein [McLaughlin agrees] to become a party to and execute and
deliver to the Company the [1991 Shareholders Agreement]." This Agreement
further provided that "[a]s a condition to the grant to [McLaughlin] of the options
. . . [McLaughlin] agrees to execute a counterpart of and become a party to [the
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1991 Shareholders Agreement] or any successor agreement or agreements thereto."
A1591
14.

On or about October 19, 1995, McLaughlin was issued stock

certificate #16 representing 2,000 shares of Cookietree common stock in partial
exercise of his options. Certificate #16 bears a notation:
"The shares represented by this certificate are subject to a right of first
refusal option in favor of the corporation and certain of its
shareholders, as provided in a Shareholders' Agreement dated January
28th, 1991."
A1591-1592
15.

On April 1, 1998 McLaughlin purchased 50,000 additional shares of

Cookietree common stock and was issued stock certificate #25. Certificate #25
bears a notation:
"The shares represented by this certificate are subject to a right of first
refusal option in favor of the corporation and certain of its
shareholders, as provided in a Shareholders' Agreement dated January
28th, 1991."
A1592
16.

On April 1, 1998 Boyd Schenk sold his son Greg Schenk 818,000 of

his total 1,363,200 shares. A215 Acquisition of the 818,000 shares brought
Greg's ownership to 2,182,200 shares or 43.6 percent of the authorized shares.
A100M002
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17.

Cookietree's Board of Directors approved these and other related

transactions on April 1, 1998. A1592
18.

On November 28, 1998 Boyd Schenk died. Id. Boyd Schenk owned

545,200 shares of Cookietree common stock at the time of his death which became
part of his estate. A218
19.

It may be inferred that since Boyd Schenk transferred some, but not

all, of his Cookietree shares to his son within months of his death, that he intended
to keep those shares and ultimately to bequeath them to his new wife, Anna.
20.

Indeed, Boyd Schenk's will left all his property, including these

shares, to his wife Anna Schenk. A1379
21.

Boyd Schenk's estate was probated in the State of Missouri. A1592

22.

On or about July 1, 1999 McLaughlin purchased an additional

100,000 shares of Cookietree common stock and was issued stock certificate #28.
This certificate bears the same restriction on transfer as McLaughlin's other
Cookietree stock certificates. A1592-1593
23.

At the beginning of August, 1999, Cookietree had 3,328,200 shares

outstanding of a total authorized 5,000,000 shares. A235 At that time,
Cookietree's shareholders were:
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a.
b.
c.
d.

Greg Schenk
Jerry Smekal
Harold Rosemann
Sam McLaughlin

e.

Kimberly McLaughlin

2,181,200
519,000
316,000
152,000
150,000

A235 The Estate of Boyd Schenk/Anna Schenk held the remaining 545,200
shares. A218
24.

At the beginning of August, 1999 Greg Schenk owned less than half

of the company's total authorized shares, or 2,181,200 of 5,000,000.
25.

On or about August 16, 1999, nine months after Boyd's death, his

Estate and/or Anna Schenk sold Boyd's Cookietree shares to Greg Schenk. In
litigation, Greg Schenk produced the cancelled share (A218), a stock power
(A219) and a Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement (A221).
26.

Prior to litigation, the transaction had not been disclosed. The

transaction is not mentioned or approved in the Minutes or written records of
Cookietree for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 or 2004. A1594
27.

The 1999 transaction was conducted without following the provisions

of the 1991 Shareholders Agreement, which, among other things, granted
Cookietree, McLaughlin and others a first right of refusal on the shares. A207
28.

After the 1999 transaction Greg owned a total of 2,726,400 shares or

54.5 percent of the 5,000,000 authorized shares.
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29.

On or about November 1, 1999 the Cookietree's Board of Directors

approved a new Shareholders Agreement (hereinafter "the 1999 Shareholders
Agreement"). A1076; A1082 All shareholders signed the new agreement, which
declared "the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement... terminated and of no further force
and effect." A1080
30.

On or about May 31, 2002, without knowledge of the 1999

transaction, McLaughlin purchased an additional 98,000 shares of Cookietree
common stock and was issued stock certificate #39. A1594 Certificate #39
contained the same language and was in the same form as McLaughlin's other
certificates.
31.

This purchase brought McLaughlin's total Cookietree stock

ownership to 250,000 shares and his wife Kim McLaughlin's ownership to
150,000 shares. Cookietree stock is the McLaughlin family's single biggest
investment. A492 Cookietree dividends constitute half the McLaughlin family's
annual income. Id.
32.

By at least 2003, Greg Schenk was verbally indicating his desire or

willingness to sell Cookietree. A1277
33.

At or around this same time, McLaughlin discovered the Greg

Schenk's stock transaction with Anna Schenk in 1999. A1279-1280
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34.

McLaughlin continued to negotiate with Cookietree to purchase

Cookietree. Schenk repeatedly indicated that he would not offer McLaughlin first
right of refusal to purchase Cookietree stock, despite the provisions in the 1991
Shareholder Agreement. A1278 Schenk's behavior toward McLaughlin changed
and he tried to coerce McLaughlin through thinly-veiled threats and intimidation to
forego his rights as a shareholder and stop his efforts to purchase Cookietree.
A1278
35.

McLaughlin announced that he was unwilling to overlook Schenk's

and Cookietree's breaches.
36.

On or about March 21, 2003 McLaughlin gave Cookietree a letter of

intent to purchase Cookietree for $12,000,000. A1278 McLaughlin ultimately
was only able to raise $9,000,000 and the deal did not close.
37.

By at least January 2004 Cookietree was actively involved in

negotiations with Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. ("Otis"), a competitor in the industry.
Otis sought to acquire Cookietree. Otis was considered to be a strategic buyer,
willing to pay more than the norm for a business because the new business
enhances their current or exiting business. Al278
38.

McLaughlin, as minority shareholder, indicated his unwillingness to

sell his shares to Otis and again demanded his right of first refusal under the 1991
Shareholders Agreement. A1279-1280

22

39.

Also at or around this same time, Greg Schenk became aware of

performance issues with the vice president of sales, an individual named Mike
Dougherty. Schenk stated he did not want to address the employment performance
issues because "I just want to sell." A1278
40.

On or about March 30, 2004 Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. gave Cookietree a

Letter of Intent ("LOI") to purchase Cookietree for $12,000,000 to $14,000,000.
A1419 The structure of the March LOI was an asset sale. A1279
41.

Immediately before Greg Schenk signed the March LOI, McLaughlin

attempted to match Otis' offer. A1279 Greg Schenk again refused to work with
McLaughlin or grant him a few additional days to come up with a written
commitment for financing. Id. Instead, Greg Schenk told McLaughlin "I'm going
to sell it to Otis" and, on April 5, 2004 signed the March LOI. A1419
42.

McLaughlin still wished to compete for the purchase of Cookietree.

Specifically:
i.

He continued to try to obtain loans and to find partners to

meet Otis' offer;
ii.

He asserted his right of first refusal under the Shareholder

Agreement;
iii.

He discovered and questioned the 1999 transaction with Anna

Schenk whereby (he then believed) Greg Schenk had doubled his
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shares5 from 1,363,200 to 2,726,400.
A237;A1279-1280
43.

Greg Schenk persisted with his stated intent to sell the company to

Otis, continued with various drafts of Letters of Intent with Otis over the next year
and refused to negotiate with McLaughlin. A1279-1280; A1426; A1443; A1449;
A1461
44.

In June, 2004, in the course and scope of negotiations for the sale of

Cookietree, Greg Schenk asked McLaughlin in an executive meeting to sign a noncompete agreement with Otis after the sale. McLaughlin refused. Greg Schenk
appeared angry that McLaughlin was not willing to agree not to compete with Otis
after the sale. Schenk said "You don't have to [sign another non-compete]. You
already have one." A1280
45.

Thereafter, Greg Schenk began to exclude McLaughlin from

executive meetings. A1281

5

Since Greg Schenk and the Board did not disclose the Anna Schenk transaction,
the details of the transaction with Anna were not known to McLaughlin or anyone
else in 2004. Indeed, McLaughlin's original inquiries and Complaint alleged that
Greg Schenk unlawfully acquired 1,363,200 shares from his father's widow. See
A6 However, during discovery, it was learned that 818,000 had been transferred
prior to Boyd Schenk's death. The 818,000 share transaction did not violate the
1991 Shareholder Agreement. Accordingly, McLaughlin dropped his claim to the
818,000 shares and has since pursued his claim over the 545,200 shares which
were transferred after Boyd's death. It is relevant, however, that this is the
evidence McLaughlin had in 2004. A237; A1280
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46.

During the same period of time, McLaughlin asserted his contractual

right to receive a bonus on the asset sale to Otis. A1281 As a result, Schenk
negotiated with Otis to change the structure of the sale to a stock sale, thereby
prohibiting McLaughlin from obtaining the bonus. Id. Indeed, the June Letter of
Intent with Otis reflects a stock sale structure. A1426
47.

McLaughlin's attorneys sent a letter to Cookietree on July 7, 2004,

asserting shareholder rights to purchase Cookietree and challenging the Anna
Schenk transaction. A1433
48.

Greg Schenk promptly faxed McLaughlin's attorney's letter, as well

as the 1991 Shareholder Agreement, to Otis. A1281-1282
49.

During the summer of 2004 McLaughlin and his "lack of cooperation

on [the Otis] transaction was discussed" in calls between Otis, Cookietree and the
advisor Daren Shaw. Shaw is the only member of these discussions to have
retained and produced notes. In each of Shaw's notes, Sam McLaughlin is
mentioned. A1282; A1401-1410 Shaw noted such things as "timing of
approaching Sam," "buying Sam's shares," "breach of contract," "Sam six months
notice required, salary and bonus payable." Id.
50.

On both July 29 and August 4, 2004, McLaughlin sent letters, as a

shareholder, to the Secretary of the Board, requesting information about the Anna
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Schenk stock transaction. A1282; A1435 McLaughlin requested to receive
information before August 13, 2004. A1282
51.

On August 2, 2004 Otis's CEO emailed Greg Schenk and said "As we

discussed if you make any progress with Sam and are ready to proceed please call.
.. I will be back the 19th [of August]." A1283; A1441
52.

On August 6, 2004 the Secretary of the Board (also the CFO, a

shareholder and an at-will employee of the company) told McLaughlin's wife (also
the Cookietree Human Resources Director) to "tell Sam [McLaughlin] to withdraw
his claims or there will be some organizational changes around here." A1283
53.

Meanwhile, the negotiations with Otis were being materially affected

by McLaughlin's claims:
i.

Cookietree faxed McLaughlin's July 7 letter to Otis as soon as

it was received;
ii.

Drafts of the Cookietree-Otis LOI contained various positions

regarding McLaughlin and his claims: requiring Cookietree to resolve
McLaughlin's issues, requiring McLaughlin to sign a non-compete with
Otis and sign off on the LOI.
iii.

Otis was requiring McLaughlin's signature on a new draft

LOI.
A1283-1284; A1419; A1433; A1443; A1449; A1461
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54.

On August 17, 2004, McLaughlin, as shareholder, made another

request for information regarding the Anna Schenk stock transaction. A1284;
A1339
55.

On that same day, Schenk personally confronted and fired

McLaughlin. A1331 McLaughlin was given a letter, stating the termination was
"without cause." A1313 Cookietree acknowledged its contractual obligation to
provide both payment and notice. Id. The letter said:
Pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of your Employment Agreement
Cookietree hereby exercises its right to terminate your employment
without cause with six months prior written notice. Accordingly, your
termination will be effective and the term of your Employment
Agreement will conclude six months from your receipt of this letter.
However, you are immediately relieved of all employment duties and
responsibilities and will remain so relieved during the remaining 6
month term of your Employment Agreement. During this 6 month
period you will receive compensation as prescribed by paragraph 5(e)
of your Employment Agreement.
Id. (emphasis added). When McLaughlin asserted his contractual right to six
months notice, Schenk called the police and had McLaughlin physically removed
from the premises. A1283 Schenk directed McLaughlin's phone and email to be
disconnected. Id. Cookietree's lawyer then called McLaughlin's lawyer and said
"everything is negotiable; we are looking for a global resolution." Id.
56.

There was no business reason for the termination; Schenk said, "I

don't need your services anymore." A1331 (emphasis added)
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57.

Instead of paying McLaughlin his contractual severance at 2004

levels, Cookietree cut McLaughlin's severance pay to 1992 levels. A1285 (The
arbitrator found this to be a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.) A1622
58.

Four business days after McLaughlin's termination, on August 23,

2004, Otis requested that Greg Schenk again ask McLaughlin to sign a noncompete. A1285-1286
59.

On September 7, 2004 Greg Schenk emailed his investment advisor

and said "I'm making good progress with Sam." A1286
60.

Cookietree was presented with another form of LOI with Otis on

September 7, 2004, 21 days after McLaughlin's termination. A1443 This LOI had
a space for McLaughlin to sign, presumably since Greg Schenk was "making
progress." Id.
61.

After McLaughlin refused to accept Cookietree's "terms," Schenk

called McLaughlin's home and cell phone twelve (12) times in one day (late
September). A1286 The final message from Schenk was "Just to let you know,
the sale of Otis is off, since you couldn't agree to the terms . . . unless you
reconsider." Id.
62.

Cookietree's advisor, Daren Shaw, knew of McLaughlin's termination

and remembered in his deposition "[a]s a senior officer and as a shareholder was
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just not being cooperative with the sale of the company" [was] "not willing to sign
a non-compete agreement [after the sale] and was not willing to sign an offer letter
from Otis [] that would obligate him to sell his shares." A1287 Daren Shaw
remembers that on one occasion Greg [Schenk] mentioned .. . [McLaughlin] had
been interested in purchasing the company himself." Id.
63.

These actions were intended to place McLaughlin in financial

difficulty so he would give up his shareholder rights under the 1991 and 1999
Shareholder Agreements. A1597
64.

These actions were in direct retaliation for McLaughlin's exercise of

his shareholder rights. The termination was intended to harm McLaughlin
economically, force him to accept the sale of Cookietree to Otis (and sign a noncompete with them) and give up his shareholders rights, Employment Agreement
rights and forgive Cookietree and Schenk's violations of fiduciary duty. A1597
65.

McLaughlin declined to "globally resolve" his claims and sued. Al

66.

In April 2005, Cookietree's Board of Directors, consisting of Harold

Rosemann, Gayle Schenk and Greg Schenk held a regularly noticed and scheduled
board meeting. A1097 Nothing about the 1999 transaction was considered or
discussed. Id.
67.

Weeks later, in May 2005, on the advice of litigation counsel,

Cookietree's Board of Directors held another meeting for which no notice was
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given. The Board and each of them purported to ratify the 1999 transaction and
waive the requirements of the 1991 Shareholder's Agreement. A227 Litigation
counsel prepared a "Unanimous Written Consent of Directors of Cookietree, Inc.
(Waiver of Restrictions on 1999 Transfer of Shares to Greg Schenk Effective as of
August 14, 1999" (hereinafter "the Board Waiver"). Greg Schenk signed the
Board Waiver. A227
68.

The Board Waiver does NOT state:
a.

The 1999 Stock transaction made Greg Schenk the majority

shareholder of all authorized shares.
b.

Greg Schenk never disclosed the 1999 stock transaction until

challenged by McLaughlin in 2004.
c.

Harold Rosemann was given additional Cookietree shares at the

same time he helped facilitate the 1999 stock transaction.
d.

Other 1999 stock transactions were disclosed and approved in

1999 Board meetings and Minutes, but the one with Anna was not.
A1003
69.

Additionally, at the time of the May 2005 Board meeting, the 1991

Shareholder's Agreement was no longer in force or effect. A1076; A1082
70.

In their deposition testimony, the two Schenks and Mr. Rosemann

testified they signed the Board Waiver because "it followed Boyd Schenk's
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wishes." None of the directors can identify a corporate purpose for the waiver and
ratification. Rather, the motivations were characterized by self-interest, financial
gain and retaliation against McLaughlin. A1598
71.

At the time of the Board Waiver, Boyd Schenk had been dead for six

and one-half (6 Vi) years. A1598
72.

Directors Gayle Schenk and Greg Schenk, husband and wife,

benefited personally from the Board Waiver. The value of 545,200 shares of
Cookietree stock had increased over the six (6) years Greg had owned it. They
received six years of significant corporate dividends and continue to receive
dividends. A1598-1599
73.

Director Gayle Schenk has no other source of support apart from her

husband, Greg. A1003 She has never voted differently than Greg in Cookietree
Board meetings. Id. She had no qualifications to sit on the Board, other than her
relationship to Greg. Id. Gayle was angry with McLaughlin "because he has
challenged Greg's acquisition of Cookietree shares . . . [and] because he has sued
Cookietree." A1003-1004 Gayle did not read the Board Waiver before she signed
it. A1004 She did not "inquire into and understand the nature of any conflicts"
before she signed the Board Waiver. Indeed Gayle testified that conflicts "did not
matter to [her]." Id. Gayle believed McLaughlin was "a threat to the company"
and that as such Cookietree had "the right to breach its contract with him." Id. at
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pp. 52-53. Gayle knew she had a potential conflict in signing the Board Waiver
but she signed it anyway. Id. at pp. 57-58. Gayle knew Greg had a potential
conflict in signing the Board Waiver. Id.
74.

Two of the shareholders, notably McLaughlin and his wife, were not

given notice of the Board meeting. A427; A1004 In fact, a Board meeting had
been regularly noticed the month before, in April, 2005 where other corporate
actions were ratified but the 1999 stock transaction was not mentioned. A1097
75.

In 2005 McLaughlin requested that Board Minutes be produced to

him. A428 The Board Waiver was not disclosed or produced per this request. Id.
It only appeared in the context of litigation. A427-428
76.

At the same time Cookietree's Board signed the Board Waiver, Greg

Schenk contacted Cookietree shareholders individually (but not Sam and Kim
McLaughlin) and asked them to sign a Waiver and Consent, also prepared by
litigation counsel (hereinafter the Shareholder Waiver"). Al 103 Greg Schenk
then signed the Shareholder Waiver himself, even though he was the subject of the
transaction at issue. A1005
77.

Greg did not contact Sam and Kim McLaughlin about the Shareholder

Waiver "because [he] didn't think they would sign it" nor did he give them any
notice of a shareholder meeting. A1071-1073; compare Cookietree Bylaws,
A1033; A1036-1037 and paragraph 4 supra.
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78.

Greg knew he had a conflict in signing the Waivers. A1072

79.

The other shareholders who signed the 2005 Waiver and Consent

were Harold Rosemann (also a Board Member) and Jerry Smekal, a resident of
Florida. A1103
80.

Greg Schenk called Jerry Smekal the same day he signed (May 17,

2005) and told him McLaughlin was "contesting the transfer of the shares" and
asked him to sign. A1073 The conversation lasted 5 minutes. Id.
81.

Greg did not read the Bylaws (requiring notice and all shareholders'

signatures) before he asked Rosemann and Smekal to sign the Shareholder Waiver.
A1036-1037;A1071
82.

The Waivers were litigation counsel's idea. A1071

83.

Director Harold Rosemann also had a conflicting interest in the

transaction. He is an at-will employee of Cookietree, Inc. subject to termination if
he does not agree with Greg Schenk. A1007 He personally was awarded the
opportunity to buy Cookietree stock at the time of the 1999 transaction; a
transaction in which he was necessarily complicitous as Secretary of the Board.
A1599
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The vulnerability of minority shareholders in the closely held corporation is
acute and well-recognized. This vulnerability is inherent in the structure of and
relationships existing in a close corporation. Close corporations are both owned
and managed by a small group: often friends and family. Shares in a close
corporation are not publicly traded and no ready or fair market for them is
available. Given its controlling interest, the majority is able to dictate to the
minority the manner in which the corporation shall be run. However, dissention in
a close corporation does not provide the minority with the option to sell his ownership interest and leave. In fact, dissention within a company makes its shares even
less marketable. A minority who disagrees with or challenges the decisions of the
majority can neither profitably leave nor safely stay in the corporation. This
dynamic leaves the minority open to various forms of oppression. As a matter of
policy, the law should recognize a right to recovery under such circumstances.
No Utah law defines the relationship between and among shareholders,
officers and directors in a close corporation. By this appeal, McLaughlin urges this
Court to adopt the standard recognized by the majority of courts and jurisdictions
in this country who have considered the issue: the existence of a heightened
fiduciary duty. The standard among partners in this state is one of "utmost good
faith and loyalty." Public policy valuing and supporting small business and
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entrepreneurship suggests the extension of such a standard to closely held
corporations. Just as in a partnership, shareholders, officers and directors in a
close corporation must expect trust, confidence and absolute loyalty from one
another if the enterprise is to succeed. The majority should not be allowed to use
position and power, or the corporation itself, to promote personal interest at the
expense of another shareholder.
In light of this standard of fiduciary duty, McLaughlin was not required to
look only to his contracts, as a shareholder and an employee, as a basis of his
fiduciary duty claim. The duty breached arose from the relationship among the
parties and could not be compartmentalized or dissected according to the injury
suffered. The facts in this case set forth a classic corporate freeze out, where
McLaughlin's disfavor with the majority shareholder, CEO and President turned
into a systematic scheme to force him to give up his shareholder rights and literally
and physically leave the company.
Also in this case, the corporate Board of Directors took action, postlitigation, to "ratify" a six and one-half (6 Vi) year old stock transfer. The Board's
action was, definitionally, a "directors conflicting interest transaction;"
furthermore, no qualified directors existed at the time to participate in the vote.
The ratification relied upon language in the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement
authorizing a waiver of transfer restrictions by the Board. However, that contract
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had been terminated by both Board and shareholder action in 1999. The
ratification also violated the company's Bylaws which required a meeting and the
participation of all shareholders. Since McLaughlin's rights were affected in the
six and one-half years between the stock transfer and the "ratification" the
ratification could not have been "valid and effective as a matter of law."
The above actions articulated in the proposed Amended Complaint stated a
breach of fiduciary claim for both the freeze out and the ratification conduct.
McLaughlin should have been allowed to amend his complaint and to proceed to
trial on his claims.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE MAJORITY
POSITION AND RECOGNIZE ENHANCED FIDUCIARY DUTIES
AMONG SHAREHOLDERS, OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS IN
CLOSE CORPORATIONS
A.

The Current State of the Law in Utah

This Court has noted, without specifically adopting, the definition of close
corporations cited by Fletcher:
(1)

a small number of shareholders;

(2)

no ready market for corporate stock; and

(3)

active shareholder participation in the business.

Dansie v. City ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23, f 17, 134 P.3d 1139 (citing Fletcher
Cyclopedia of Private Corps. § 70.10 (perm. ed. 2002)). In 2004, in the context of
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the dissenters' rights statute, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized a heightened
duty to "'deal fairly and openly' with [] minority shareholders . . . when the
majority shareholder negotiates with itself to dispose of corporate assets."
Bingham Cons. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434, f 23, 105 P.3d 365.
Also, in a series of cases, Utah appellate courts have considered the
application of a so-called "close corporation exception" to the derivative action
rule. See Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah
1998); Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 1999 UT 91, 991 P.2d 584; Dansie v.
City ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23, 134 P.3d 1139; and GLFP, Ltd. v. CL Mgt., Ltd.,
2007 UT App 131, 163 P.3d 636. Most recently, in GLFP the Utah Court of
Appeals questioned the viability of the exception. 2007 UT App at f 25.
Utah has never defined the fiduciary duties among and between
shareholders, officers and directors in a close corporation. The Utah legislature
has not adopted the Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement or any
variation thereof6. Arguably, in prior cases, Utah has recognized unique issues and

6

Only 15 state legislatures have adopted statutes responding to the particular issues
and needs of close corporations.
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potential for abuse with close corporations7. Notwithstanding, the extant definition
of fiduciary duty is Utah the one applying to corporations in general; "[directors
and officers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporation and its
stockholders" and are "obliged to . . . preserve and enhance the property and
earning power of the corporation, even if the interests of the corporation are in
conflict with their own personal interests." Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730
(Utah 1982).
Also of significance is the recent Utah Court of Appeals case of d'Elia v.
Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, 147 P.3d 515. There, the court noted that in
Utah fiduciary duties arise by operation of law and not necessarily from
contractual relationship. 2006 UT App 416 at f 36. A breach of those duties
sound in tort, not in contract. Id. "[A]n officer or director of a corporation is not
personally liable for torts of the corporation or of its other officers and agents
merely by virtue of holding corporate office, but can only incur personal liability

7

"We recognize that the rationale for requiring an action to proceed derivatively is
often absent in a closely held corporation, where it is unlikely that there is a
disinterested board because the majority shareholders are often the corporation's
managers. As well 'the concept of a corporate injury that is distinct from any
injury to the shareholders approaches the fictional in the case of a firm with only a
handful of shareholders." Aurora Credit, 970 P.2d at 1280 (citing American Law
Institute Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommenda-tions §
7.01(d)).
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by participating in the wrongful activity." Id. at % 38 (quoting Armed Forces Ins.
Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, \ 19, 70 P.3d 35; Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private
Corps. § 1137.
In this appeal, McLaughlin asks the Utah Supreme Court to define the law of
close corporations in Utah and to set forth the fiduciary duties between and among
shareholders, officers and directors in a close corporation. Since this is an issue of
first impression, it is appropriate to look to the law of other states for authority and
reasoning.
B.

The Majority Position

The majority rule among courts/jurisdictions that have considered the issue
is that shareholders in a closely held corporation owe fiduciary duties directly to
one another, and that a breach of these duties results in actionable conduct,
described as minority oppression. The leading case is Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co., Inc. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).

%

See e.g. Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 551 (Alaska 1983); River Mgt. Corp. v.
Lodge Properties, Inc., 829 P.2d 398 (Colo. App. 1991); Battaglia v. Battaglia,
596 N.E.2d 712 (111. App. 1992); Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. App.
1984); Fought v. Morris, 543 So.2d 167 (Miss. 1989) (adopting Orchard v.
Covelli, 590 F.Supp. 1548 (W.D. Penn. 1984)); Russell v. First YorkSav. Co. 352
N.W.2d 871 (Neb. 1984) (overruled on other grounds); Van Pelt v. Greathouse,
352 N.W.2d 871 (Neb. 1984); 68th Street Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78
(N.J. Super. L.Div. 1976); Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 457
(N.M. App. 2001); Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio App. 1992); A. Teixiera
& Co., Inc. v. Tiexeira, 699 A.2d 1383 (R.I. 1997); Hall v. Tennessee Dressed Beef
Co., 957 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Tenn. 1997).
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In Donahue a minority shareholder applied to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts after the trial court dismissed her fiduciary duty claim. Plaintiff
alleged the defendants caused the corporation to purchase shares in violation of
their fiduciary duty to her. As in this case, the trial judge dismissed the case with
the implied finding that the transaction was in good faith. Id. at 580.
In considering the appeal, the Donahue court first defined a close
corporation with terms substantially identical to the ones recited by this Court in its
Dansie opinion. Dansie, 2006 UT 23 at f 17. "As thus defined, the close
corporation bears striking resemblance to a partnership." Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at
512. "Just as in a partnership, the relationship among the shareholders must be one
of trust, confidence and absolute loyalty if the enterprise is to succeed." Id. The
Donahue Court went on to note other traits inherent in the close corporation
structure:
Although the corporate form provides . . . advantages for the
stockholders (limited liability, perpetuity, and so forth), it also
supplies an opportunity for the majority stockholders to oppress or
disadvantage minority stockholders. The minority is vulnerable to a
variety of oppressive devices, termed 'freeze-outs,' which the
majority may employ. An authoritative study of such 'freeze-outs'
enumerates some of the possibilities: The squeezers [those who
employ the freeze-out techniques] may refuse to declare dividends;
they may drain off the corporation's earnings in the form of exorbitant
salaries and bonuses to the majority shareholder-officers and perhaps
to their relatives, or in the form of high rent by the corporation for
property leased from majority shareholders; they may deprive
minority shareholders of corporate offices and of employment by the
company; they may cause the corporation to sell its assets at an
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inadequate price to the minority shareholders . . . " In particular, the
power of the board of directors, controlled by the majority, to declare
or withhold dividends and to deny the minority employment is easily
converted to a devise to disadvantage minority stockholders.
Id. at 513 (citations omitted). While a minority shareholder can sue, "in practice,
the plaintiff will find difficulty in challenging dividend or employment policies."
Id.
In recognition of the potential for abuse, Massachusetts held that
"stockholders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same
fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another."
Id. at 515. That standard is one of "utmost good faith and loyalty." Id; c.f. Burke
v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1982) ("Partners obviously occupy a
fiduciary relationship and must deal with each other in the utmost good faith");
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-18. "Stockholders in close corporations must discharge
their management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict
good faith standard. They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest or
in derogation of their duty to other stockholders and the corporation." Donahue,
328 N.E.2d at 515. It is this standard that McLaughlin asks the Utah Supreme
Court to adopt by this appeal.
The Donahue court acknowledged that their standard is a heightened one
and more "stringent" than the standard which applies to "directors and stockholder
of all corporations." Id. at 515-516; compare Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727,
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730 (Utah 1982). Significant policy reasons support the adoption of a heightened
standard.
Close corporations are distinctive entities. Traditional corporate law
principles "derive from the view of the corporate entity as separate and distinct
from its shareholders whose business is not conducted by its principals but by
elected directors." 68th Street Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78, 84 (NJ. Super.
L.Div. 1976). "[C]lose corporations consist of friends or family members where
the directors, officers and shareholders are synonymous. Each contributes his or
her capital, skill, experience, and labor to the company. Management and
ownership are substantially identical. Each shareholder has an insider view of the
company's operations and maintains an element of trust and confidence in each
other which is commonly lacking in a large or publicly held corporation." Fought
v. Morris, 543 So.2d 167, 171 (Miss. 1989).
Traditional corporate principles can be inapposite and even absurd in the
close corporation context. Utah has already noted as much: "the concept of a
corporate injury that is distinct from any injury to the shareholders approaches the
fictional in the case of a firm with only a handful of shareholders." Aurora Credit,
970 P.2d at 1280-1281 (emphasis added). "It would [] be vain to attempt to
distinguish acts done as shareholders from those done as directors, or to distinguish
a principal's duty to serve the corporation as director from his right to protect his
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personal interest as stockholder." 68th Street Apts., 362 A.2d at 84. Adoption of a
partnership standard merely recognizes these realities.
Individuals have more than one role or "hat to wear" in a close corporation
and an individual's status cannot be singularly defined. For example, in this case
Greg Schenk was at once a shareholder, the president of the board and the chief
executive officer. McLaughlin was a shareholder, a vice president of operations
and chief operating officer. "[I]t is generally understood that, in addition to
supplying capital and labor to a contemplated enterprise and expecting a fair
return, parties comprising the ownership of a close corporation expect to be
actively involved in its management and operation." Balvik v. Sylvester, 411
N.W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1987). It is fictional to say that Schenk was only acting as
CEO when he fired McLaughlin and that his actions were directed only at
McLaughlin as an employee. There is no doubt McLaughlin was terminated
because of his actions as an owner and officer; his performance as an employee
had never been questioned (A 1277), and Schenk was clearly disturbed by
McLaughlin's refusal to "go along" with the sale to Otis.
Shareholders in a close corporation are "vulnerable to a variety of oppressive
devices." Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449,457 (N.M. App. 2001).
A "freeze out" has been defined as "manipulative use of corporate control to
eliminate minority shareholders or otherwise unfairly deprive them of advantages
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or opportunities to which they are entitled." Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644, 648
(Ohio App. 1992). An enhanced concept of fiduciary duty prohibits a majority
shareholder from "using his power to promote his personal interests at the expense
of corporate interests." Id. "[Oppression is usually directed at a minority
shareholder personally, whereas fraudulent or illegal conduct can instead be
directed at solely the shareholder's investment in the corporation." Brenner v.
Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1028 (N.J. 1993)
There is a ready source of precedent to help provide content to the concept
of fiduciary duty in close corporations. The standard is, in essence, a partnership
one which has been in existence in Utah for decades. It makes sense to "borrow
from allied disciplines those principles and rules which seem best to comport with
the mixed nature of the close corporation form." Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644,
648 (Ohio App. 1992).
The Donahue rule is not one-sided. Donahue recognized that, conversely,
"the minority may do equal damage through unscrupulous and improper 'sharp
dealings' with an unsuspecting majority." Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515, n. 17.
The fiduciary duties recognized do not result from simply being the majority, but
arise out of the nature of relationships in close corporations. The duties are
reciprocal. Indeed, Massachusetts later held that self interest is not necessarily
synonymous with improper motivation and held that controlling groups should be
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allowed to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for their actions. Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
A shareholder's remedy for oppression, to sell her shares, is constricted (or
impossible) in a close corporation, almost by definition. "Restrictions on stock
sales, transfers or encumbrances are generally the rule in close corporations.
Limited markets exist for stock in these corporations and potential investors are
naturally reluctant to purchase a non-controlling interest in a closely held
corporation which has been marked by dissension and dissatisfaction." McCauley
v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 R2d 232, 236 (N.M. 1986). It is appropriate
that a remedy be fashioned by this court since selling on the open market is not a
practicable one.
The statutory remedy, dissolution, is a drastic remedy. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10a-1430; McCauley, 724 P.2d at 236 ("An order of corporate dissolution is a
drastic remedy and should be utilized sparingly, after consideration of other
alternative forms of relief') (citations omitted); Balvic v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d at
388 ("[F]orced dissolution of a corporation is a drastic remedy which should be
invoked with extreme caution and only when justice requires it"). Many courts, in
turn, have recognized alternative equitable and legal remedies. Recognition of the
fiduciary duty applicable to partnerships provides for a potential tort cause of
action for breach and provides for tort (money) damages if they can be proven.
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Close corporations, in the form of small businesses, entrepreneurial entities
and family enterprises in this state, form a significant part of the economy. Small
businesses provide new jobs, new inventions, economic opportunity and
independence to individuals. The profits and strength of small business are based
on a competitive environment. Such entities frequently "originate in the context of
relationships personal in nature, often undertaken by family members or friends. It
is ironic that these enterprises become a most frequent setting for the exploitation
of minority shareholders when the personal relationship has gone sour." Orchard,
590 F. Supp. at 1558. With its "limited ownership and a high level of mutual
dependency [and] because it requires close cooperation in management, and
because the majority can control corporate decision-making to the detriment of the
minority, Courts must be prepared to fashion special relief in appropriate
circumstances." Id. at 1559. Adoption of a duty to act in utmost good faith and
loyalty in transacting corporate affairs serves not only to protect the participants
but also ultimately insures the success of the entity.
This Court has noted that "legal duty . . . is the product of policy judgments
applied to relationships." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, f 17, 143
P.3d 283. "A court's conclusion that duty does or does not exist is 'an expression
of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
plaintiff is [or is not] entitled to protection.'" Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 2005 UT 80,
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f 9,125 P.3d 906. Based on these statements, the realities of relationship among
participants and the strong policies at play, this Court may comfortably define the
legal duty among shareholders, directors and officers in a close corporation. The
heightened fiduciary duty concept has been defined in different ways:
"intrinsically fair9" "good faith and fair dealing10" and, in the context of oppression
statutes, as a violation of the "reasonable expectations11" of the minority
shareholder. McLaughlin is asking that the Utah Supreme Court adopt the "utmost
good faith" partnership standard among shareholders in close corporations subject
to Utah law.

9

Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F.Supp. 1548 (W.D. Perm. 1984); Fought v. Morris, 543
So.2d 167 (Miss. 1989).
10

Fix v. Fix Material Co., Inc., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Baker v.
Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 1973).

/;

Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985); Smith v. Leonard, 876 S.W.2d
266 (Ark. 1994); Polk v. Hergert Land & Cattle Co., 5 P.3d 404 (Colo. App.
2000); Maschmeier v. Southside Press, Ltd. 435 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa App. 1988);
Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929 (Mont. 1982); Brenner v. Berkowitiz, 634
A.2d 1019 (NJ. 1993); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232
(N.M. App. 1986); Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63 (N.Y. 1984);
Meiselman v. Meiselmean, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983); Balvic v. Sylvester, 411
N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987); Hendrick v. Hendrick, 755 A.2d 784 (R.I. 2000);
Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Systems & Services, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257 (S.C. 2001);
Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1988); Masinter v. Webco, 262
S.E.2d 433 (W.Va. 1980); Jorgenson v. Water Works., Inc. 582 N.W.2d 98 (Wis.
App. 1998).
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C.

The Minority Position

In their arguments below, Defendants argued the application of two main
cases, Berman v. Physical Med. Assocs.f Ltd., 225 F.3d 429, 433 (4th Cir. 2000)
and Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37 (Del. 1996). A1236; A1492 The
Riblet plaintiff was fired from his position in a close corporation and sued in
federal court under his employment contract. The opinion does not describe what
facts, other than plaintiffs termination, were at issue in the breach of fiduciary
duty claim. One must assume there were none. The Seventh Circuit certified a
question of law to the Delaware Supreme Court asking "[w]hether majority
shareholders in a Delaware corporation have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to a
minority shareholder, who is also an employee under a written contract, with
respect to issues affecting that employment." Id. at 39. The Delaware court
interestingly restated the certified question: "[w]hether majority stockholders of a
Delaware corporation may be held liable for violation of a fiduciary duty to a
minority stockholder who is an employee of the corporation under an employment
contract with respect to issues involving that employment." Id. 'The certified
question [was]... answered in the negative." Id. at 40.
In its analysis the Riblet court noted that "[t]his is not a case of breach of
fiduciary duty to [plaintiff] qua stockholder." Id. at 40. In the second sentence of
the opinion, Riblet noted that "the dispute arises solely with respect to th[e]
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employment contract." Id. at 37. "Whether or not the majority stockholders may
have breached a fiduciary duty to [plaintiff] qua stockholder or to the corporation
is not before us." Id. Riblet is therefore distinguishable from the case at bar; here,
the dispute was essentially a shareholder dispute and termination was used as one
oppressive tactic of many.
Notwithstanding the procedural and factual differences from this case, Riblet
should still be rejected as precedent. Unlike most courts who have considered the
issue, Riblet was unwilling to recognize that strict compartmentalization of roles in
a close corporation is a fiction. Riblet expressly rejected the Massachusetts rule
(Donahue/Wilkes) and stated "[t]he fact that Riblet is closely held does not, for
this purpose, alter the duties of stockholders inter se from those which prevail for
publicly-held corporations." Id. at 39, n.2. Delaware is in the minority on this
issue.
The second case Defendants relied upon is Berman v. Physical Med. Assocs.,
Ltd., 225 R3d 429 (4th Cir. 2000). Berman was a doctor, employed by a
corporation owned and controlled by doctors. After issues arose about Berman's
unprofessional behavior, Berman attempted to resign. The Board (the other
doctors) met and voted to terminate him. Berman prevailed at trial on a breach of
employment agreement claim. Berman also claimed that "he was owed a fiduciary
duty and that the directors, in terminating his employment, breached this duty by
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failing to follow fair and established corporate procedures." Id. at 433. The Fourth
Circuit expressly did not reach the question at issue in this appeal: do the fiduciary
dutfies] of a director in a close corporation run[] to stockholders individually, as
well as to stockholders as a class..." Id. The case was resolved on different
grounds; namely, that Berman's "status as a stockholder" was not "implicated,"
only his status as an employee. Id.
Berman, therefore, is ultimately distinguishable procedurally and on its
facts. Procedurally, the Fourth Circuit did not reach the question, finding that
Berman did not allege any of "the rights available to him as a stockholder" had
"been denied." Id. This differs from the McLaughlin case because McLaughlin
alleged that many of his rights as a shareholder were denied to him {e.g. the right
to disclosure, access to information, the right to purchase a pro rata share of the
Anna Schenk stock in 1999, the right of first refusal to purchase Cookietree stock
in 2004). McLaughlin alleges that one of the ways Defendants froze him out and
took retaliatory action for the assertion of these rights was to fire him.
Significantly, employment termination was only one among many items of
damages McLaughlin alleged as a shareholder: he was denied the opportunity to
own additional shares in 1999, denied the benefit of the appreciated value of the
shares 1999-2007, the dividends on the shares 1999-2007, denied the opportunity
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to purchase Cookietree in 2004, suffered lost wages, lost income and economic
loss from being frozen out of the company and put on the street and may be
entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs.
By this appeal, McLaughlin asks the Utah Supreme Court to look not to the
source of the injury (qua shareholder, qua employee) but to the source of the duty.
Prior Utah law certainly provides a sound foundation for such an approach. D'Elia
at f 36.

In the court below, the judge reasoned that since the Otis transaction never
closed there could be no damage:
To the extent the breach of fiduciary duty claim relates to the
proposed sale to Otis Spunkmeyer, the sale never occurred and there
is absolutely no evidence of any damage that plaintiff incurred as a
result of the activities surrounding the non-existent sale.
A1508 McLaughlin's argument was misunderstood. Although under the 1991
Shareholder's Agreement McLaughlin had a first right of refusal to purchase
Cookietree shares, Schenk flatly refused to negotiate with McLaughlin in 2004 or
extend him additional days to obtain financial backing. A1279 Schenk made
clear: "I'm going to sell it to Otis." A1419 Schenk's personal economic incentive
to breach the 1991 Shareholder's Agreement in this regard is clear: Otis was a socalled "strategic buyer" and was willing to pay more. McLaughlin asserted his
rights, made written requests for information (from legal counsel and personally)
and pursued the issue. Not only did Schenk deprive McLaughlin of his rights and
the potential in 2004 , but he froze McLaughlin out and retaliated against him for
the attempt. Stated thusly, it is not material that the Otis transaction did not close.
The existence of a strategic buyer and all the LOIs structured around McLaughlin
provide a motive and context for Schenk's actions.
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D,

McLaughlin's Request for Relief

McLaughlin respectfully summarizes his request of this Court below on this
issue of first impression.
1.

Definition for Close Corporations and Adoption of
the Partnership Standard

This Court should specifically adopt the definition of "close corporations"
recited in its Dansie opinion:
(4)

a small number of shareholders;

(5)

no ready market for corporate stock; and

(6)

active shareholder participation in the business.

Dansie, 2006 UT 23 at f 17. In so doing, it should also be noted that a close
corporation is more like a partnership than a corporation. This Court should adopt
the "utmost good faith and loyalty" standard of fiduciary duty among shareholders.
This is identical to the partnership standard in Utah. Burke v. Farrell, 656 P.2d
1015, 1017 (Utah 1982) ("Partners obviously occupy a fiduciary relationship and
must deal with each other in the utmost good faith."); Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-18.
This court should also specifically follow Donahue and its progeny, rejecting the
minority position represented by Riblet and Berman. "[MJajority shareholders and
directors in close corporations" "are required to exercise their utmost good faith
and cannot use their corporate power in bad faith or for their individual
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advantage." River Mgt. Corp. v. Lodge Properties, Inc., 829 P.2d 398, 401 (Colo.
App. 1991); see also Masinterv. Webco, 262 S.E.2d 433 (W.Va. 1980)
(stockholders, officers and directors owe the duty to the minority).
2.

The Duty Arises From Operation of Law, not
Contract

Consistent with the Utah Court of Appeals' statements in d'Elia v. Rice Dev.
Inc., 2006 UT App 416,147 P.3d 515, this Court should specifically recognize that
the fiduciary duties among shareholders in close corporations arise by operation of
law independent of contractual relationships that may or may not exist. 2006 UT
App 416 at f 36. A breach of those duties sound in tort, not in contract. Id. Tort
damages, including punitive damages may be recoverable.
3.

One May Incur Personal Liability for Breach

D'Elia found that officers and directors "may incur personal liability by
participating in the wrongful activity." Id. at f 38 Consistent with this reality, the
Utah Supreme Court should rule that "[a] transaction whereby an officer or
director uses his position with the corporation, uses the corporation, or uses
corporate funds for the purpose of promoting his personal interest at the expense of
another shareholder may be the basis for a cause of action against the officer or
director." Hall v. Tennessee Dressed Beef Co., 957 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Term. 1997).
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E.

The Trial Court's Errors

The trial court made several errors in its ruling. The decision found that "all
of the causes of action in [the employment action, including, by implication the
breach of fiduciary duty claim against Greg Schenk individually] arose from the
employment relationship." A1506 The ruling stated that "[f|or a fiduciary duty
claim to be present in this case, plaintiff would need to identify a duty, breach and
damages, separate from any of the contractual obligations that existed between the
parties." A1508-1509 This was error since the duties among the parties arose by
operation of law and not solely by contract.
The trial court further found that Greg "Schenk did not owe any fiduciary
duty to Mr. McLaughlin that applies to the dealings related to Mr. McLaughlin in
his role as an employee." Id. In Utah, it is appropriate to look to the source of the
duty not to the source of the injury. An act of employment termination may very
well violate the law (i.e. racial discrimination) or a contract of employment and at
the same time be an act of oppression. To look only to the type of injury ignores
the significance of the duty.
The trial court found that Cookietree, not Greg Schenk, fired McLaughlin.
In close corporations, "[i]t would [] be vain to attempt to distinguish acts done as
shareholders from those done as directors, or to distinguish a principal's duty to

54

serve the corporation as director from his right to protect his personal interest as
stockholder." 68th Street Apts., 362 A.2d at 84.
The trial court found that Schenk's "role as officer of the [close] corporation
d[id] not create any new fiduciary relationship to Mr. McLaughlin." A1506-1607
In close corporations, these duties are owed to the minority by officers, directors
and stockholders. Masinter, 262 S.E.2d at 247.
F.

Defendants Breached their Fiduciary Duty to McLaughlin

In the court below, the Defendants successfully convinced the judge that this
case could be compartmentalized according to the contractual duties at play: stock
and employment. The employment claims arising under that contract were
referred to arbitration. The stock claims were dismissed in large part due to the
Waivers procured in 2005. See Argument II, supra. Because the case was
bifurcated and then analyzed narrowly according to contract, the heart of
McLaughlin's case — the freeze out - was never considered.
1.

Duty

Definitionally Cookietree is a close corporation. Through Schenk's and
Rosemann's control of management, the board and stock, they controlled the
corporation. Schenk and Rosemann had a fiduciary duty to McLaughlin that arose
because of their relationship as shareholders/management in a close corporation.
This duty arose through operation of law, not by virtue of any of the contracts

55

between McLaughlin and the corporation. This duty was one of "utmost good
faith and loyalty." Schenk and Rosemann could "not act out of avarice,
expediency or self-interest or in derogation of their duty to other stockholders and
the corporation." Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
McLaughlin tried to exercise his right of first refusal to buy Cookietree
stock. He questioned Schenk's secret acquisition of stock in 1999 from his father's
widow. If the 1999 transaction were unwound, McLaughlin would have had the
opportunity to acquire additional shares. McLaughlin requested documents. He
refused to sign LOIs and new non-compete agreements with the strategic buyer.
Schenk and Rosemann could not, through the "manipulative use of corporate
control... eliminate minority shareholders or otherwise unfairly deprive them of
advantages or opportunities to which they are entitled." Gigax v. Repka, 615
N.E.2d 644, 648 (Ohio App. 1992). Schenk and Rosemann could not use their
power to promote "personal interests at the expense of corporate interests." Id.
2.

Breach

Defendants ignored and breached this duty all along. In 1999 they
conducted a secret stock transaction for the benefit and gain of one shareholder —
and the detriment of and loss to other shareholders. Additional stock was awarded
to the Secretary of the Board, who facilitated the transfer, at the same time. See
Statement of Facts, infra, at f 83. The transaction was also not disclosed. Id. at 26.
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Schenk refused to honor McLaughlin's first right of refusal to purchase, or even
negotiate to purchase, the corporation in 2003-2004. Id. at fi 34-41. When
questioned, Schenk felt threatened and therefore refused to provide documents or
information. Id. SchenkshutMcLaughlinoutof participation in the business. Id.
at 145.
In 2004 Defendants conspired with their financial consultant and the
strategic buyer to put pressure on McLaughlin. Id. at f 49. They needed
McLaughlin to give up his issues and rights and cooperate. Id. at f 44. Knowing
McLaughlin and his family situation intimately, Schenk decided to put
McLaughlin in a position of economic hardship so he would have no choice but to
accede. Id. at f l 52, 55.
McLaughlin's employment was the first domino to kick over. Id. at f 55.
No reason or business purpose existed for termination, but McLaughlin was an atwill employee. Id. atf 56. McLaughlin's contractual severance was reduced, in
bad faith, and contrary to prior practice, to 1992 levels. Id. at f 57. McLaughlin
was escorted from company property by law enforcement, based upon an
unsubstantiated allegation of trespass. Id. at % 55. Defendants refused to give
employment references so that McLaughlin could not obtain other employment.
After being put on the street, McLaughlin was strategically approached for a
"global resolution" and presented with the new LOI, a non-compete and a
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settlement agreement. Id. at f 60. Schenk called McLaughlin repeatedly; once 12
times in one day. Id. at f 61. Schenk tried to use the employment termination as
leverage in negotiating with McLaughlin over the stock sale. Id. at f 55.
Defendants also found it necessary to cure the problems with the stock
transaction accomplished and hidden back in 1999. Id. at f 67. The contract
authorizing waiver of the transfer restrictions had been terminated. Id. at f 29.
Although everyone had a conflicting interest and no one was "qualified", the Board
still voted to ratify the transfer ex post facto. Id. at f 67. Shareholders, consisting
mainly of Greg Schenk and Harold Rosemann, also signed a Waiver. Id. at <J[ 76.
The shareholders who were alleging damage from the transaction, the
McLaughlins, were not even approached, notified of a vote or asked to participate.
Id. at f 11. Conflicts, interest, company bylaws and the nullified contract were
ignored. Id. at fj[ 73, 77, 78. In the end, Schenk and Rosemann obtained
additional shares and McLaughlin did not. Id. at ffl 25, 83.
"It would [] be vain to attempt to distinguish acts done as shareholders
from those done as directors, or to distinguish a principal's duty to serve the
corporation as director from his right to protect his personal interest as
stockholder." 68th Street Apts., 362 A.2d at 84. Defendants committed these acts
of breach, not in any particular role and not directed at McLaughlin in any
particular role. They committed them, they participated personally in them, and
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they are liable individually for those acts. D'Elia, 2006 UT App 416 at f 38. "A
transaction whereby an officer or director uses his position with the corporation,
uses the corporation, or uses corporate funds for the purpose of promoting his
personal interest at the expense of another shareholder may be the basis for a cause
of action against the officer or director." Hall, 957 S.W.2d at 541 (emphasis
added).
3.

Damage

Under the Shareholder's Agreement, McLaughlin was entitled to a right of
refusal for acquiring the shares. Schenk's 1999 behavior and the Board's selfinterested 2005 behavior have prevented this. McLaughlin was contractually
entitled to acquire a percentage of the transferred shares in 1999 but that right was
thwarted by an after-the-fact ratification, engineered by litigation counsel years
after the transaction. Cookietree's profitability and share value have increased
significantly since 1999. McLaughlin has lost not only the opportunity to own the
shares, but the increase in value in those shares over eight (8) years. The dividends
McLaughlin could have received during the years 1999-2007 from those
wrongfully denied shares are significant.
As further items of damage, McLaughlin was frozen out of the company,
terminated, had his severance cut and was frozen out without notice, resulting in
lost wages and income. These actions were taken in direct retaliation for his
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challenge of the 1999 transaction and are damages flowing from the breaches of
fiduciary duty. Punitive damages are also available in a breach of fiduciary duty
case.
This matter should be remanded to the court based upon the Utah Supreme
Court's articulation of a heightened fiduciary duty to allow McLaughlin to proceed
on his claims.
II.

MCLAUGHLIN SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND
HIS COMPLAINT
The trial court denied McLaughlin's request to amend his complaint to add

parties and causes of action. A1571; A1574; A1735 McLaughlin submitted a
proposed form of complaint which set forth his fiduciary claim. A1587
Previously, that claim had been pled in three complaints, in the stock action, the
employment action and the derivative action. A12; B9; C35
The trial court had challenged McLaughlin to identify a "duty, breach and
damages, separate from any of the contractual obligations that existed between the
parties." A1508-1509 McLaughlin did this as demonstrated above at pp. 55 - 60
and below at A1574. In light of the Utah Court of Appeals' statements in d'Elia
that fiduciary duties arise by operation of law and not necessarily from contractual
relationship the court was wrong in looking narrowly at fiduciary duty as flowing
from contract. D'Elia, 2006 UT App 416 at f 36. A breach of fiduciary duties
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sound in tort, not in contract. Id. They can exist in the presence of a contract
between the parties and also in the absence of one. The trial court clearly erred in
looking for fiduciary duty only in the contracts among the parties. As a result, it
was an abuse of discretion for McLaughlin's motion to amend complaint to add
parties and causes of action to be denied.
III.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED GIVEN
THE EXISTENCE OF FACTUAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE
2005 "RATIFICATION" BY THE COOKIETREE BOARD AND
SOME OF ITS SHAREHOLDERS
One of the disagreements between Schenk and McLaughlin in 2003 and

2004 was Schenk's acquisition of stock from his father's widow, Anna Schenk.
The stock action alleged breach of contract (A8) and breach of fiduciary duty
(A 12). In an after-the-fact attempt to legitimize the acts complained about in
McLaughlin's Complaint, litigation counsel procured "waivers" from Cookietree's
Board of Directors and some of its shareholders. A227; A230 Defendants then
brought a motion for summary judgment claiming the stock transaction in question
had been "ratified." A189
McLaughlin objected to the Waivers and opposed summary judgment on
several bases. Namely,
13

Just because McLaughlin was an at-will employee does not mean his termination
could not have been an item of damage in the course and scope of a breach of
fiduciary duty. As demonstrated herein, McLaughlin's employment was a wedge
and a tool used by the oppressive majority to deprive McLaughlin of rights to
which he was entitled.
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a.

the ratification was invalid because the Shareholder Agreement

from which it derived authority was expired and expressly nullified;
b.

the ratification was invalid because it was a conflicting interest

transaction;
c.

the ratification and waiver violated Cookietree bylaws; and

d.

the ratification and waiver was untimely, or there was a

question of fact as to timeliness.
A993 Even though he found Schenk and the other actors to be "self dealing" and
"un-American14" the trial judge granted summary judgment and found the Board
Waiver and Shareholder Waivers "effective as a matter of law." McLaughlin
asked for clarification and for an analysis accepting or rejecting each of his
substantive defenses (A 1513) but none was forthcoming. A1735
A.

The 1991 Shareholders' Agreement was Expired and
Expressly Nullified; Therefore No Authority Could Have
Existed for the Waivers

Interpretation of contract terms is a question of law and legal conclusions are
reviewed for correctness. Canyon Meadows Home Owners Ass'n v. Wasatch
County, 2001 UT App 414, f 7,40 P.3d 1148. The facts, however, must be viewed
in a light most favorable to McLaughlin, as the claims were dismissed on summary
judgment. GLFP, 2007 UT App 131 at 1 5 .

14

A1753atp.27.
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From 1991 - 1999 Cookietree shares were subject to a 1991 Shareholder's
Agreement dated January 28, 1991. A207 The 1991 Shareholder's Agreement
provided that:
-* -

-

if a shareholder wished to sell his/her shares, those shares had to be

offered first to Cookietree and then to the other shareholders, pro rata; Id. at f 2
*

Boyd Schenk was allowed to transfer shares to his wife or son during

his life or by his will without first offering them as set forth in paragraph (a); Id. at
19
*

Any transferees of stock were subject to the share restrictions; Id.

The secret transaction that secured Greg Schenk's ownership of 54.5% of all
Cookietree shares occurred on August 16, 1999. On November 1, 1999 the
Cookietree's Board of Directors approved a new Shareholders Agreement
(hereinafter "the 1999 Shareholders Agreement"). A1076; A1082 All
shareholders signed the new agreement, which declared "the 1991 Shareholders'
Agreement. .. terminated and of no further force and effect." A1080 (emphasis
added). At the time the Board and shareholders terminated the 1991 Shareholders'
Agreement, the 545,200 share transaction was still secret.
The Waivers derive authority from that 1991 Shareholder's Agreement,
111. At the time the Waivers were procured, then, the 1991 Shareholder's
Agreement had been "terminated." A1076; A1080 To be valid, any waiver must
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have been procured before November 1, 1999, the date the Shareholder's
Agreement was nullified. This was a period of time, however, when Greg Schenk
was still concealing the stock transaction. As a matter of plain contract

.~

interpretation, therefore, the Waivers were procured under authority of a voided
contractual provision and could not have been "effective as a mater of law." The
trial court plainly erred in failing to so hold.
B.

The Waivers Were Conflicting Interest Transactions as
Defined by Statute

As an alternative objection, McLaughlin demonstrated that the Waivers were
conflicting interest transactions. A1007 Since the trial court upheld the legal
validity of the Waivers, it must have rejected this argument. This Court reviews
questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the
district court's legal conclusions. Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d
518,519 (Utah 1997).
The Utah Revised Business Corporation Act defines a director's conflicting
interest transaction and sets forth a procedure for enjoining, setting aside or
sanctioning the same. Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-850 - 853. A director's
conflicting interest transaction is "a transaction effected or proposed to be effected
by the corporation, or by any entity controlled by the corporation respecting which
a director has a conflicting interest." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-850(2). There is
no case law in Utah interpreting these provisions and McLaughlin asks this Court
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to rely on the plain statutory language, with no deference to the trial court's
conclusions.
The "transaction" effected is the 2005 ratification15. The document is signed
by Greg Schenk, Gayle Schenk and Harold Rosemann. A227 None were
qualified directors and each had a conflict. The application of the code with
respect to each signatory is discussed below.
1.

Greg Schenk's Conflict and Interest

In early August 1999 Greg Schenk held 2,181,200 shares. A218 Five
million (5,000,000) shares were authorized. A235 Boyd Schenk died and left his
Cookietree shares to his new wife of six-months. A1379 In a private transaction
on August 16, 1999, Schenk acquired those shares without them first being offered
to the company and other shareholders pro rata as required by the then-existing
Shareholders' Agreement. The transaction secured Greg Schenk's ownership of a
majority of the authorized shares. See p. 20, supra. The transaction was not
mentioned in any Board minutes in 1999 or in the six years that followed. A1594

In the proceedings below, Defendants argued that the "transaction" was the 1999
stock transfer between Greg Schenk and Anna Schenk. Al 180 This confusion
may have contributed to the trial court's erroneous ruling. Indeed, the "transaction
. . . to be effected by the corporation" was the ex post facto ratification of the
transfer six and one-half years later, after McLaughlin's shareholder rights had
been trampled, after the secret was exposed, after McLaughlin had asserted his
rights and suffered retaliation for it and after the commencement of litigation. The
attempt at ratification was certainly an act "of the corporation."
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Litigation counsel recommended that the Board ratify the transaction after
litigation was initiated. As a matter of law, the 2005 Board Waiver was a
"director's conflicting interest transaction:" it was "a transaction effected or
proposed to be effected by the corporation" . . . "respecting which a director has a
conflict of interest." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-850(2). Schenk had a "conflicting
interest" because the 1999 stock transfer being ratified was one in which Schenk
had a "beneficial interest" and was "so financially significant to the director that
the interest would reasonably be expected to exert an influence on the director's
judgment." Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-850(l)(a). The transfer being ratified was
the one shoring up Schenk's majority control.
Greg Schenk benefited personally from the Board Waiver. The value of the
545,200 shares of surreptitiously obtained Cookietree stock had increased over the
six (6) years Greg had owned it. He has received six years of significant corporate
dividends and continues to receive dividends. A1598-1599 He will continue to do
so until his shares are sold, and presumably then he will receive another unjustified
and illegal windfall.
2.

Gayle Schenk's Conflict and Interest

Gayle Schenk, wife of Greg Schenk, was the second Board member to sign
the Board Waiver. She, too, had a "conflicting interest" because she was a "related
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person" to Greg Schenk, holder of the "beneficial interest" and one to whom the
ratification was so "financially significant."
Gayle gave telling deposition testimony on these points. She has no source
of support apart from her husband, Greg. A1003 She has never voted differently
than Greg in Cookietree Board meetings. Id. She had no qualifications to sit on
the Board, other than her relationship to Greg. Id. Gayle was angry with
McLaughlin "because he has challenged Greg's acquisition of Cookietree shares
. . . [and] because he has sued Cookietree." A1003-1004 Gayle did not read the
Board Waiver before she signed it. A1004 She did not "inquire into and
understand the nature of any conflicts" before she signed the Board Waiver. Gayle
testified that conflicts "did not matter to [her]." Id. Gayle believed McLaughlin
was "a threat to the company" and that as such Cookietree had "the right to breach
its contract with him." Id. at pp. 52-53. Gayle knew she had a potential conflict in
signing the Board Waiver but she signed it anyway. Id. at pp. 57-58. Gayle knew
Greg had a potential conflict in signing the Board Waiver. Id.
Even if she had not impeached herself, Gayle, with a "familial" and a
"financial" relationship with a director who had a conflict of interest, could not be
a "qualified director." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-850(3).
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3.

Harold Rosemann's Conflict and Interest

The third Board member to sign the 2005 Board Waiver was Harold
Rosemann, the company's CFO and a shareholder. He is an at-will employee of
Cookietree, Inc. subject to termination if he does not agree with Greg Schenk.
A1007 He personally was awarded the opportunity to buy Cookietree stock at the
time of the secret 1999 stock transaction; a transaction in which he was necessarily
complicitous as Secretary of the Board. A1599 Definitionally, Rosemann could
not have been a "qualified director" because he has an "employment relationship
with a second director who does have a conflicting interest." Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10a-850(3).
4.

No Safe Harbor

A director's conflicting interest transaction can be legitimatized if it falls
within a safe harbor provision created by statute. The first of these is the directors'
action. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-852. No directors' action could be effectuated
under the statute since no "qualified directors" existed and a vote of "qualified
directors" is required. Id.
The second of the safe harbors attempted by Cookietree was shareholders'
action. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-853. Shareholders' action is effective: (1) if a
quorum existed; and (2) a majority of the votes entitled to be cast by qualified
shares present in person or in proxy at the meeting were cast in favor of the
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transaction; (3) the vote was cast after notice to shareholders describing the
director's conflicting interest transaction, provision of information and disclosure
to the shareholders. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-853.
First, no quorum existed. A quorum requires a "majority of the votes
entitled to be cast by the holders of all qualified shares/' Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10a-853(2) (emphasis added). Sam and Kim McLaughlin held qualified
shares but were not included in the vote. Non-qualified shares, namely Greg
Schenk's shares, were included in the vote. Second, there was no meeting and the
vote was conducted in a manner designed to freeze out certain of the shareholders.
Jerry Smekal signed after a 5-minute phone conversation with Greg Schenk. The
McLaughlins were not contacted at all.
Lastly, the required information and disclosures were not made. Preparing
the Waivers, Defendants did not disclose several material facts:
*

The 1999 Stock transaction made Greg Schenk the majority

shareholder of all authorized shares.
*

Greg Schenk never disclosed the 1999 stock transaction until

challenged by McLaughlin in 2004.
*

Harold Rosemann was given additional Cookietree shares at the same

time he helped facilitate the 1999 stock transaction.
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*

Other 1999 stock transactions were disclosed and approved in 1999

Board meetings and Minutes, but the one with Anna was not.
A1003 The shareholders' action statute requires disclosure of "all facts known to
the director respecting the subject matter of the transaction that an ordinarily
prudent person would reasonably believe to be material." Id.; Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10a-850(4)(b). "Thus, it is absolutely essential to the validity of a ratification
by the shareholders of such a voidable contract that it be made with full knowledge
on the part of the shareholders of the terms of the contract and of the directors'
interest. Want of such knowledge renders void a vote of ratification." Fletcher
Cyclopedia of Private Corps. § 984. "Ratification may be proved by showing that
all the shareholders of a corporation had knowledge . . . " Whittier v. Harold
Austin Const., Inc., 935 S.W. 2d 579, 583 (Ark. App. 1996). "Whether
shareholders are fully informed turns upon whether directors have complied with
their duty to disclose all material information when seeking affirmative votes of
shareholders." Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1128 (Del. 1999). As set
forth above, material information was withheld.
The conflicting interest transaction does not fit in to any of the safe harbor
exceptions. The trial court should not have ignored the existence of the conflict of
interest and granted summary judgment.
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C.

The Waivers Violated Cookietree Bylaws

Not only did the safe harbor statute require a meeting, so did Cookietree
Bylaws. Duly adopted bylaws are a contract between the corporation and its
shareholders and must be observed. Hall, 957 S.W.2d at 539. Greg Schenk did
not bother to consult the Bylaws prior to procuring the May 2005 Waivers.
A1036-1037; A1071 Cookietree Bylaws require notice for shareholder meetings.
A1933 Because they were no more than post-litigation posturing, the May 2005
Waivers were obtained without notice and without a meeting. The Bylaws further
require that action taken without a meeting "shall be signed by all of the
shareholders entitled to vote with respect to the subject matter thereof." A10371037 Sam and Kim McLaughlin were frozen out and not asked to sign. The
Bylaws were not followed, rendering the attempted "waiver" void. "To suggest
that a corporation has no legal duty to follow its own bylaws would be to reduce
the bylaws to meaningless mounting of words." Hall, 957 S.W.2d at 539.
D.

The Waivers were Untimely, or There was a Question of Fact as
to Timeliness.

Even if the ratification were deemed to have occurred, McLaughlin is
entitled to have the issue of its timeliness decided by a jury. The six and one-half
year ex post facto ratification could not possibly have been "timely as a matter of
law." "The question of whether the board of directors should be deemed to have
ratified the agreement on behalf of the corporation depends on questions of fact
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and inference to be drawn therefrom." Lake Creek Irrigation Co. v. Clyde, 451
P.2d 375, 377 (Utah 1969) (citing Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corps. § 781).
Because so much time passed between the date of the transfer and the
alleged ratification, the delay created an unfair and disadvantageous result for
McLaughlin. He took a stand, Schenk took retaliatory action and McLaughlin was
forced to sue to enforce his rights. u[T]he rights of a third person have intervened .
. . in such a case it would be unjust to allow the principal to ratify the act of the
agent at a later date if beneficial to it, or to repudiate it if it proved detrimental to
its interest. In such a situation, a subsequent ratification of an act performed by an
unauthorized agent is not valid." U.S. v. 40,438 Square Feet of Land in Boston, 66
F.Supp. 659, 663 (D. Mass. 1946) (citing Mechem on Agency § 528, Story on
Agency §§ 246, 247). The trial court erred in implicitly finding as a matter of law
that the alleged ratification was timely.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
By this appeal, McLaughlin asks the Utah Supreme Court to set forth the
standard for fiduciary duty among shareholders in a close corporation.
McLaughlin asks that the partnership standard of "utmost good faith and loyalty"
be applied to members of a close corporation and that this Court specifically adopt
and approve Donahue and its progeny. Judge Hilder's Rulings and Orders dated
4/26/07 and 8/6/07 should be REVERSED and the case remanded for further
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proceedings consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's statements of law on
fiduciary duty. This case should be remanded to allow McLaughlin to amend his
complaint to articulate a fiduciary duty claim which arises by operation of law and
from the relationship of these parties as partners in a close corporation.
McLaughlin further requests that this Court find, as a matter of law, that the
attempted ratification in 2005 was not effective or valid. The contractual authority
under which the Waivers were drafted had long been terminated by Board and
shareholder vote. The Waivers were conflicting interest transactions under the
statute. Given intervening events and the lengthy passage of time between the
1999 secret stock transfer and the 2005 Waivers, there was at minimum a question
of fact as to the timeliness of the purported ratification. On remand, McLaughlin
should be allowed to pursue his breach of contract and breach of covenant of good
faith and fair dealing claims with respect to Defendants' 1999 conduct in
transferring stock outside the express terms of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2007.

MARGARET H. OLSON, Of Counsel
LINCOLN W. HOBBS
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Board Waiver (A227-228)
Shareholder Waiver (A230-233)
04/26/07 Ruling and Order (A1504-1512)
08/06/07 Ruling and Order (A1735-1738)
(Proposed) Second Amended Complaint (A1587-1603)

Tabl

UNANIMOUS WRITTEN CONSENT OF DIRECTORS
OF
COOKIETREE, INC.
(Waiver of Restrictions on 1999 Transfer of Shares to Greg Schenk)
Effective as of August 15,1999

On the dates indicated next to each director's signature below, the undersigned, being all
of the directors of Cookietree, Inc., a Utah corporation (the "Company"), hereby adopt the
following resolutions by unanimous written consent without a meeting pursuant to Section 821
of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act (the "Act") to be effective as of August 15, 1999:
WHEREAS the Company is a party to that certain Shareholders' Agreement dated as of
January 28,1991 among the Company and certain shareholders of Cookietree (the "1991
Shareholders Agreement").
WHEREAS pursuant to that certain Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement dated August
16,1999 between the estate of Boyd F. Schenk and Greg F. Schenk, the estate of Boyd F.
Schenk transferred 545,200 shares of common stock of the Company ("Shares") to Greg F.
Schenk (the "1999 Transfer").
WHEREAS pursuant to Section 11 of the Shareholders Agreement, the directors desire to
cause the Company to consent to the waiver of all restrictions (except the restriction contained in
Section 10 of the Shareholders Agreement) on transfer in the Shareholders Agreement relating to
the transfer or sale to Greg Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer.
WHEREAS some of the directors have interests in the 1999 Transfer, and as a result, the
1999 Transfer may be deemed a "conflicting interest transaction" under Section 850 of the Act,
and the potentially conflicted directors desire to disclose their interests to the board of directors.
WHEREAS the interests that may cause some directors to be potentially conflicted
directors include the following:
Director

Potential Interest in Transactions

Greg Schenk

In the 1999 Transfer, Boyd F. Schenk, Greg Schenk's father,
transferred to Greg Schenk 545,200 Shares. Greg Schenk is the
president of the Company.

Gayle Schenk

Gayle Schenk is the wife of Greg Schenk. See potential interest in
transactions for Greg Schenk above.

Harold Rosemann

Harold Rosemann is the secretary and treasurer of the Company.

SaltLakc-243943.3 0061604-00002
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WHEREAS having been apprised of the interests of the potentially conflicted directors
and having had a frill opportunity to inquire into and understand the extent and nature of those
interests, the board of directors of the Company desires to waive any restrictions relating to the
transfer or sale to Greg Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the directors hereby determine that it is in
the best interest of the Company and its shareholders for the Company to waive any restrictions
relating to the transfer or sale to Greg Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer;
RESOLVED FURTHER that, pursuant to Section 11 of the Shareholders Agreement, the
Company hereby waives and consents to the waiver of the provisions of the Shareholders
Agreement (except the restriction contained in Section 10 of the Shareholders Agreement)
relating to any transfer or sale (whether made in the past or to be made in the future) to Greg
Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer. Without limiting the generality of the
prior sentence, the Company hereby consents to the waiver of all restrictions on transfer
contained in the Shareholders Agreement (except the restriction contained in Section 10 of the
Shareholders Agreement) relating to any transfer or sale (whether made in the past or to be made
in the future) to Greg Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer;
RESOLVED FURTHER that this unanimous written consent have the same force and
effect as a unanimous vote of the undersigned directors at a meeting that has been duly called,
convened and held in accordance with the Act and the articles of incorporation and bylaws of the
Company; and
RESOLVED FURTHER that this unanimous written consent may be executed in any
number of counterparts and together such counterparts shall constitute one original document.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned directors have executed this Unanimous
Written Consent of Directors of Cookietree, Inc. to be effective as of the datefirstwritten above.

Harold Rosemann

SaltLake-243943.3 0061604-00002
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WAIVER AND CONSENT
This Waiver and Consent (this "Waiver") is made as of May 17, 2005 by each of the
undersigned shareholders (each a "Shareholder," and collectively, the "Shareholders") of
Cookietree, Inc.. a Utah corporation ("Cookietree").

BACKGROUND
A.
The Shareholders are parties to that certain Shareholders' Agreement dated as of
January 28, 1991 among Cookietree and certain shareholders of Cookietree (the "Shareholders
Agreement").
B.
Pursuant to that certain Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement dated August 16,
1999 between the estate of Boyd F. Schenk and Greg F. Schenk, the estate of Boyd F. Schenk
transferred 545,200 Shares to Greg F. Schenk (the "1999 Transfer").
C.
Pursuant to Section 11 of the Shareholders Agreement, the Shareholders desire
now to consent to the waiver of all restrictions in the Shareholders Agreement on the transfer or
sale to Greg Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer (except the restriction
contained in Section 10 of each of the Shareholders Agreement).
WAIVER AND CONSENT
1.
Defined Terms. Capitalized terms in this Wavier that are not otherwise defined in
this Waiver have the meanings given those terms in the 1999 Shareholders Agreement.
2.
Waiver. Pursuant to Section 11 of the Shareholders Agreement, each of the
Shareholders hereby waives and consents to the waiver of the provisions of the Shareholders
Agreement (except the restriction contained in Section 10 of the Shareholders Agreement)
relating to any transfer or sale to Greg Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer.
3.
Counterparts: Facsimile. This acknowledgement, waiver and consent may be
executed in duplicate counterparts, each of which, when executed, shall be deemed to be an
original, and all of which together shall be deemed one and the same instrument. A facsimile
copy or other accurate copy of this acknowledgement, waiver and consent or any counterpart of
this acknowledgement, waiver and consent is binding as an original.

[Signature pages follow.]
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Shareholder has executed this Waiver and
Consent as of the date first set forth above.
SHAREHOLDER:

C^V^^f ^^TQ^ < < •~

3/C*,000

Name

Number of shares held as of August
16,1999

Date
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Shareholder has executed this Waiver and
Consent as of the datefirstset forth above.
SHAREHOLDER:

'Z, /'2j\

ZOO

Number of shares held as of August
16,1999

/ 7 why
Date
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Shareholder has executed this Waiver and
Consent as of the date first set forth above.
SHAREHOLDER:

^je^W/g^
wjjfc
/

/
/

Q5* J/7

szq pan
Number of shares held
hcl as of August
16, 1999

/^LOOS

Date
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SAMUEL R. MCLAUGHLIN and JOHN

:

RULING AND ORDER

DOES 1-10,

Consolidated
CASE NOS. 040924997
050906729

Plaintiffs,
vs.
GREG SCHENK; ESTATE OF BOYD SCHENK;
ANNA SCHENK; COOKIETREE, INC.; and :
JOHN DOES 1-10,
:
Defendants.
SAMUEL R- MCLAUGHLIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COOKIETREE, INC., a Utah
corporation, and GREG SCHENK,
Defendants.

On February 26, 2 0 07,

the Court heard argument on two pending

Motions for Summary Judgment filed by defendants in these consolidated
actions. Matthew M. Durham, Esq., argued the Motions for defendants, and
Margaret H. Olson, Esq., argued for plaintiff.

Following argument, the

Court took the matters under advisement.
One of the Motions has been pending for over twenty months.

The

background is that, following consolidation of these actions, the Court
addressed

some

Motions, particularly

defendants'

argument

that

the

employment-related claims were the subject of an arbitration agreement.

UrsTU
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The

court

also
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addressed,

and granted,

MINUTE ENTRY
a Motion

to Stay the non-

arbitrable claims.
Both

the parties

and

the Court have

referred

to the matters

consolidated into the one action as "Complaint A" (the non-employmentrelated matters, including such claims as wrongful appropriation of
corporate opportunity, breach of fiduciary duty, and related matters) ,
and

"Complaint B"

(which addresses the employment

agreement-related

claims). Following hearing on November 22, 2005, among other rulings, the
Court ordered that the Complaint B causes of action were subject to
arbitration.

The Motion filed on June 29, 2005, relates to all of the

claims asserted in Complaint A.

The Motion filed on January 12, 2007,

relates to any claims potentially remaining in Complaint B, recognizing
that arbitration has been completed pursuant to the Court's Order.
Motions were argued on February 26, 2007.
Motion

filed by

defendants

in January,

Both

I will first address the

2007, which

is directed to

Complaint B.
As already noted, the Court previously granted Cookietree's Motion
to Compel Arbitration, and action on Complaint A was stayed pending
completion of that arbitration.

Based on some agreement between the

parties (particularly concerning a non-competition agreement), the only

MCLAUGHLIN V. SCHENK
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claims in Complaint B submitted to the arbitrator were the claims for
breach of employment contract against Cookietree, plaintiff's claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against
Cookietree, and his claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Greg
Schenk, in his individual capacity.
On January 2, 2007, the arbitrator issued a decision on plaintiff's
claims, which
fiduciary

duty

resolved
claim.

all

issues, except

Because

the

the

fiduciary

issue
duty

of

claim

breach of
was

left

unresolved by the arbitrator, Mr. Schenk has now requested this Court to
dismiss that claim, as it is asserted in Complaint B, which Complaint
relates solely to the employment relationship.
The Court will address below the issue of whether any fiduciary duty
claim asserted in Complaint A is still viable, but this first part of the
Court's ruling deals solely with Complaint B.
This distinction is important, because as the Court understands the
arguments, and reads the Amended Complaint, all of the causes of action
in Complaint B arise from the employment relationship.

For all of the

reasons stated by defendant Schenk, the Court finds that Mr. Schenk did
not owe any fiduciary duty to Mr. McLaughlin that applies to the dealings
related to Mr. McLaughlin in his role as an employee.

In addition, Mr.

I

AJ1/A
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Schenk did not terminate Mr. McLaughlin from his employment.

That was

an action of Cookietree, of which Mr. Schenk was admittedly President,
but Mr. Schenk1s role as officer of the corporation does not create any
new fiduciary relationship to Mr. McLaughlin. Accordingly, the remaining
cause of action in Complaint B (that is, the one claim not resolved by
the arbitrator) , alleging breach of fiduciary duty against Mr. Schenk,
or a request for constructive trust (which is a remedy, rather than a
cause of action), be and hereby is dismissed.
Turning to Complaint A, which is the subject of the Motion filed in
2005, the Court notes that the consolidation of the actions appears to
have created some confusion regarding which causes of action are at issue
in the two Motions for Summary Judgment that were argued on February 26,
2007.

That is, plaintiff has argued that Mr. Schenk breached his

fiduciary duty in several ways, including the stock purchase from Mr.
Schenk's father's widow; negotiation of the sale of Cookietree to Otis
Spunkmeyer
McLaughlin.
duty

claim

(a sale that never occurred) ; and the termination of Mr.
As already noted, to the extent the breach of a fiduciary
relates

in any way

to

the employment

and

termination,

regardless of whether said claim is asserted in Complaint A, Complaint
B (or, as it appears, in both Complaints), the Court finds that there is
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no fiduciary duty owed by Mr. Schenk or Cookietree to Mr. McLaughlin, and
all employment-related claims are now completely resolved.
With respect to the stock sale, the propriety of that sale (which
was based upon the terms of the 1991 shareholder's agreement), the Court
finds that all of the actions taken by both Cookietree and Mr. Schenk
were within the terms of the agreement

and, to the extent

certain

corporate actions were not undertaken at the time of the sale, the 2005
waiver and ratification actions were effective as a matter of law.
To the extent the breach of fiduciary duty claim relates to the
proposed sale to Otis Spunkmeyer, the sale never occurred and there is
absolutely no evidence of any damage that plaintiff incurred as a result
of the activities surrounding the non-existent sale. Because damages are
an essential element of any claim, the absence of any evidence of damage
is fatal to a claim based on a proposed sale to Otis Spunkmeyer, that
never occurred.
Based on the foregoing conclusions, the Court is unable to identify
any factual claim in plaintiff's Complaint that would give rise to a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

For a fiduciary duty claim to be

present in this case, plaintiff would need to identify a duty, breach,
and damages, separate

from any of the contractual

obligations

that

MCLAUGHLIN V. SCHENK
existed

between

the

PAGE 6
parties.
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date, he

has

failed

to

do so.

Considering each of the causes of action briefly, the Court rules as
follows:
With respect to the claim for wrongful appropriation of a corporate
opportunity, if that claim is solely based upon the purchase of the
corporation's shares, that is not legally a corporate opportunity.

To

the extent it may implicate the proposed sale to Otis Spunkmeyer, for the
reasons stated regarding damages, that circumstance will not support a
claim for wrongful appropriation of corporate opportunity.
The Court has already addressed the breach of fiduciary duty claim
set forth in the second cause of action.

The Court's determination is

that to the extent that claim relates to the employment relationship,
purchase of its shares, or the Otis Spunkmeyer sale, there is no evidence
before the Court supporting that claim.

In an abundance of caution, the

Court will not dismiss the second cause of action at this time, but it
will be plaintiff's burden to identify any other factual basis for a
breach of fiduciary duty claim, independent of any contract or other duty
already alleged, if he chooses to go forward on his second cause of
action, and that claim may not implicate the three issues identified
herein.

PAGE I

MCLAUGHLIN V. SCHENK

MINUTE ENTRY

The third cause of action, mismanagement, and the fourth cause of
action,

corporate

waste, both

appear to

the

Court

to be merely

duplicative of the other claims. Each addresses such issues as fiduciary
duty, the transfer of the shares to Greg Schenk, and to some degree the
proposed Spunkmeyer sale. These causes of action be and hereby are
dismissed.

Finally, the civil conspiracy claim can only exist in

conjunction with at least one other claim that is found to be legitimate.
Because the Court has left the door open for plaintiff to identify some
as yet unidentified factual basis for a breach of fiduciary duty, the
fifth cause of action shall not be dismissed at this time.
The foregoing ruling represents the Court's Order regarding the two
pending Motions for Summary Judgment. In summary, all causes of action,
with the possible exception of the breach of fiduciary duty claim
unrelated to the issues specifically addressed, and the civil conspiracy
claim, are dismissed.

The burden is on plaintiff to come forward with

i sir
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facts and evidence that would support a breach of fiduciary duty claim
that has not already been addressed
Dated this

_day of April, 2007

R^BE^T TC. HIL'DER
DISTRICT COURT JUDG

I CSvH
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this

<*^ day of April, 2007:

Margaret H. Olson
Attorney for Plaintiff
466 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Matthew M. Durham
Justin B. Palmer
Attorneys for Defendants Greg Schenk
and Cookietree
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
George M. Haley
Richard D. Flint
Attorneys for Defendant Anna Schenk
299 S. Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC^rd J u d f c f c ^
5/sfr/ct
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AUG - g 200?

SAMUEL R. MCLAUGHLIN and JOHN

RULING AND ORDER

DOES 1-10,

CASE NO. 040924997

^Pc/eTT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
GREG SCHENK; ESTATE OF BOYD
SCHENK, ANNA SCHENK, COOKIETREE
INC., a Utah corporation, and JOHN DOES
1-10,

Judge Robert K. Hllder

Defendants.

This matter is currently before me on plaintiff Samuel McLaughlin's: (1) Motion to Amend
Ruling & Order; (2) Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award; and (3) Motion to Amend Complaint. The
case has been argued and decided, and the pending motion is well-briefed. I do no find that
additional argument will aid determination of the matter. Accordingly, I now issue the following
rulings as stated herein.
(1) Motion to Amend
Mr. McLaughlin asks the Court to amend its April 25, 2007, Order in order to state the
grounds for its decision in terms of plaintiff's numerous defenses to the 2005 waiver and ratification
issues. Pursuant to Rule 52(a), when addressing a motion for summary judgment based on more
than one ground, I am required to "issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision."
Upon consideration, I find that my April 25, 20071, ruling fully comports with the requirements of

'In that ruling, I state, "[w]ith respect to the stock sale, the propriety of that sale (which
was based upon the terms of the 1991 shareholder's agreement) the court finds that all of the
actions taken by both Cookietree and Mr. Schenk were within the terms of the agreement and,
to the extent certain corporate actions were not undertaken at the time of the sale, the 2005
waiver and ratification actions were effective as a matter of law."

^ ^ ^
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Rule 52(a) and therefore I decline plaintiffs invitation to provide further clarification.
(2) Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award
On April 7, 2007, arbitrator Lois Baar entered her Arbitration Award and denied Mr.
McLaughlin's request for attorney fees. Through his pending motion Mr. McLaughlin requests that
I vacate Ms. Baar's award based upon her alleged failure to allow plaintiff to present evidence, call
witnesses or ultimately articulate the theory of his case.
Utah's Uniform Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-31a-124, provides specific
circumstances under which a reviewing court may vacate an arbitrator's award. Here, other than
the somewhat amorphous claims of "misconduct" and acting "contrary to statute," plaintiff does not
cite to a specific provision of the statute supporting vacatur. Accordingly, based upon the absence
of a specific violation under the Act, along with Utah's strong presumption in favor of upholding an
arbitrator's award, I deny Mr. McLaughlin's request to vacate.
(3) Motion to Amend Complaint to Add Parties & Causes of Action
In my April 25, 2007 Ruling I commented on amendment of the complaint by stating,
For a fiduciary duty claim to be present in this case, plaintiff would need to identify
a duty, breach and damages, separate from any of the contractual obligations that
existed between the parties.... [I]t will be plaintiff's burden to identify any other
factual basis for a breach of fiduciary claim, independent of any contract or other
duty already alleged.... The burden is on plaintiff to come forward with facts and
evidence that would support a breach of fiduciary claim that has not already been
addressed.

MCLAUGHLIN v. SCHENK
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In light of that language, Mr. McLaughlin now requests that I allow amendment of his
complaint so he may address an alleged tort-based fiduciary duty that arose between the
shareholders of this closely held corporation.
While my April 25, 2007, Ruling left open the possibility of an amendment, I find that Mr.
McLaughlin has not met the requirement to do so; namely, the identification of evidence that "has
not already been addressed." Specifically, the evidence that plaintiff posits in support his "new"
breach of fiduciary duty claim (the 1999 stock transfer, the termination of employment, the
reduction of McLaughlin's salary and negotiation of the sale of Cookietree) has all been previously
addressed. I find the absence of any "new" evidence would make the proposed amendment futile
and therefore plaintiffs Motion to Amend is denied.
Dated this 6th day of August, 2007.
By the COUP

Robert». Hnder
District Court Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling, to the
following, this (t> day of Julyf2007:

Lincoln W. Hobbs
Margaret H. Olson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
466 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3342
Matthew M. Durham
Justin B. Palmer
Attorneys for Defendants Greg Schenk
and Cookietree
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Richard D. Flint
Attorney for Defendant Anna Schenk
299 S. Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263
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LINCOLN W. HOBBS, #4848
MARGARET H. OLSON, #6296
Of Counsel
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C.
525 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 519-2555
Facsimile: (801) 519-2999
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SAMUEL R. MCLAUGHLIN and JOHN
DOES 1-10,

(Proposed) SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
v.
GREG SCHENK, GAYLE SCHENK,
HAROLD ROSEMANN, ESTATE OF BOYD
SCHENK, ANNA SCHENK,
COOKIETREE, INC. a Utah
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 110,

CONSOLIDATED
Civil No. 040924997 MI
Judge Robert K. Hilder

Defendants.
Plaintiff, Samuel R. McLaughlin, hereby complains and
alleges against Defendants as follows:
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1.

Plaintiff Samuel R. McLaughlin is an individual

residing in the State of Utah:

McLaughlin was employed by

Defendant Cookietree, Inc. from 1992 until August, 2004.
McLaughlin is a shareholder of Defendant Cookietree, Inc.
2.

Plaintiffs John Does 1-10 are past and present

shareholders of Defendant Cookietree, Inc. who may have suffered
similar injury to Plaintiff as a result of Defendants' conduct;
however, the identities and/or individual claims of John Does
1-10 are presently unknown.
3. Defendant Greg Schenk is an individual residing in Salt
Lake County, Utah.

At all times relevant hereto, Greg Schenk

was also a shareholder, the President and a director of
Defendant Cookietree, Inc.
4. Defendant Gayle Schenk is an individual residing in Salt
Lake County, Utah.

At all times relevant hereto, Gayle Schenk

was married to Greg Schenk and was a director of Defendant
Cookietree, Inc.
5. Defendant Harold Rosemann is an individual residing in
Salt Lake County, Utah.

At all times relevant hereto, Harold

Rosemann was the Chief Financial Officer of Cookietree, Inc., a
shareholder in Cookietree, Inc. and a director of Defendant
Cookietree, Inc.
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6. Defendant Estate of Boyd Schenk is an entity under the
Uniform Probate Code and exists, on information and belief, in
the State of Missouri.

The decedent, Boyd Schenk, was a

shareholder of Defendant Cookietree, Inc. at the time of his
death.

Jurisdiction over the Estate is proper pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. 78-27-24.
7. Defendant Anna Schenk was the wife of Boyd Schenk at the
time of his death in November, 1998.

On information and belief,

Anna Schenk was Boyd Schenk's sole heir.
resident of the State of New York.

Anna Schenk is a

Jurisdiction over Anna

Schenk is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-27-24
8. Defendant Cookietree, Inc. ("Cookietree") is a Utah
Corporation authorized to do business in the State of Utah.
9. Defendants John Does 1-10 are persons acting in concert
with the named Defendants but who have not yet been identified
and/or whose actions subjecting them to liability for the Causes
of Action pled below have not been discovered.
10.

This action arises from stock transactions performed

and retaliatory and punitive actions taken in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.

Jurisdiction is therefore proper pursuant to

3

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3-4 and 78-27-24. Venue is proper pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-13-4 and 78-13-7.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
11.

Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 10 above

as if fully set forth herein.
12.

Cookietree was formed in 1981 under the laws of the

State of Utah.

Currently, Cookietree has authorized 5,000,000

shares of common stock.
13.

Defendants Greg Schenk and Boyd Schenk were among the

original shareholders of Cookietree.
14.

On January 28, 1991 the shareholders of Cookietree,

including both Schenks, entered into a Shareholders Agreement
("1991 Shareholders Agreement") which placed restrictions on the
sale or transfer of Cookietree stock.
15.

On or about March 9, 1991, Boyd Schenk was issued

stock certificate #11 representing 1,363,200 shares of
Cookietree common stock.

On or about the same date, Greg Schenk

was issued stock certificate #10 representing 1,363,200 shares
of Cookietree common stock.
16.

On or about December 14, 1992 Cookietree hired

Plaintiff Sam McLaughlin and entered into an Employment
4

Agreement with him.

The Employment Agreement provided

McLaughlin with stock options allowing McLaughlin to acquire up
to 200,000 shares of Cookietree common stock.

The Employment

Agreement noted that the shares "would be xrestricted
securities' . . . and subject to various restrictions on
transfer."
17.

Later, in 1993, Cookietree and McLaughlin entered into

an Incentive Stock Option Agreement defining McLaughlin's option
to purchase an additional 200,000 shares of Cookietree common
stock.

This Agreement provided that "upon exercise of any

options granted herein [McLaughlin agrees] to become a party to
and execute and deliver to the Company the [1991 Shareholders
Agreement]."

This Agreement further provided that u[a]s a

condition to the grant to [McLaughlin] of the options . . .
[McLaughlin] agrees to execute a counterpart of and become a
party to [the 1991 Shareholders Agreement] or any successor
agreement or agreements thereto."
18.

On or about October 19, 1995, Sam McLaughlin was

issued stock certificate #16 representing 2,000 shares of
Cookietree common stock in partial exercise of his options.
Certificate #16 bears a notation:
5

"The shares represented by this certificate are
subject to a right of first refusal option in favor of
the corporation and certain of its shareholders, as
provided in a Shareholders' Agreement dated January
28th, 1991."
19.

On April 1, 1998 Sam McLaughlin purchased 50,000

additional shares of Cookietree common stock and was issued
stock certificate #25.

Certificate #25 bears a notation:

"The shares represented by this certificate are
subject to a right of first refusal option in favor of
the corporation and certain of its shareholders, as
provided in a Shareholders' Agreement dated January
28th, 1991."
20.

Cookietree's Board of Directors approved these

transactions, and other related transactions, on April 1, 1998,
21.

On November 28, 1998 Boyd Schenk died.

Boyd Schenk

owned 545,200 shares of Cookietree common stock at the time of
his death which became part of his estate.
22.

Boyd Schenk's will left all his property, including

these shares, to his wife, Anna Schenk.
23.

On information and belief, Boyd Schenk's estate was

probated in the State of Missouri.
24.

On or about July 1, 1999 McLaughlin purchased an

additional 100,000 shares of Cookietree common stock and was
issued stock certificate #28.

This certificate bears the same
6

restriction on transfer as McLaughlin's other Cookietree stock
certificates.
25.

At some time, either before or after Boyd Schenk's

death, certificate #11 was surrendered and replacement
certificates #17 and #18 were issued in the amount of 818,000
shares and 545,200 shares, respectively.
26.
Schenk.

Certificate #18 for 545,200 shares was issued to Greg
He was issued replacement certificate #31.

The

company's stock transfer ledger reflects that these shares were
transferred to Greg Schenk on August 16, 1999, approximately 9
months after Boyd Schenk's death.
27.

The transfer of Boyd Schenk's 545,200 shares to Greg

Schenk (hereinafter "the 1999 transaction") is not mentioned or
approved in the Minutes or written records of Cookietree for
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 or 2004.
28.

The 1999 transaction was conducted without following

the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders Agreement, which, among
other things, granted McLaughlin and others a first right of
refusal on the shares.
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29.

The 1999 transaction was kept secret and not disclosed

to Cookietree shareholders, who shared similar rights under the
1991 Shareholders Agreement, until after 2004.
30.

On or about November 1, 1999 the Cookietree's Board of

Directors approved a new Shareholders Agreement (hereinafter
"the 1999 Shareholders Agreement'7) .
31.

On or about May 31, 2002, without knowledge of the

1999 transaction, McLaughlin purchased an additional 98,000
shares of Cookietree common stock and was issued stock
certificate #39.
32.

On or about June 12, 2002 Greg Schenk surrendered

certificate #s 10, 19 and 31 and was issued replacement
certificate #32 for 2,726,400 shares of Cookietree common stock.
On the same date Sam McLaughlin surrendered certificate #s 16,
25 and 28 and was issued replacement certificate #35
representing 152,000 shares.
33.

On or about March 21, 2003 McLaughlin gave Cookietree

a letter of intent to purchase Cookietree for $12,000,000.
McLaughlin ultimately was only able to raise $9,000,000 and the
deal did not close.
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34.

McLaughlin continued to negotiate with Cookietree to

purchase Cookietree.

Schenk repeatedly indicated that he would

not offer McLaughlin first right of refusal to purchase
Cookietree stock, despite the provisions in the 1991 Shareholder
Agreement.

Schenk's behavior toward McLaughlin changed and he

tried to coerce McLaughlin through thinly-veiled threats and
intimidation to forego his rights as a shareholder and stop his
efforts to purchase Cookietree.
35.

By at least January 2004 Cookietree was actively

involved in negotiations with Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. ("Otis"), a
competitor in the industry.
36.

Otis sought to acquire Cookietree.

McLaughlin, as minority shareholder, indicated his

unwillingness sell his shares to Otis and demanded his right of
first refusal under the 1991 Shareholders Agreement.
37.

At or around this same time, McLaughlin discovered the

conduct alleged in paragraphs 25 - 26 above.
38.

McLaughlin announced that he was unwilling to overlook

Schenk's and Cookietree's breaches.
39.

On or about March 30, 2004 Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. gave

Cookietree a letter of intent to purchase Cookietree for
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$12,000,000 to $14,000,000.

Over the course of the next year,

Otis made several more offers to purchase Cookietree's stock.
40.

By April 2004 Schenk overtly refused to allow and

ignored McLaughlin's attempt to match Otis' offer to purchase
Cookietree and signed the letter of intent.
41.

McLaughlin, as a shareholder, made written request to

Cookietree to produce its corporate records in an effort to
discover information about the 1999 transaction and Schenk's
acquisition of Cookietree additional shares.
42.

McLaughlin hired an attorney to enforce his rights and

the attorney made demand on Cookietree to offer McLaughlin first
right of refusal.

Schenk and Cookietree refused and continued

to negotiate with Otis.
43.

A few days after McLaughin's written request for

information, Cookietree terminated McLaughlin without cause and
without notice.

McLaughlin's Employment Contract required 6

months notice.
44.

Cookietree and Schenk trespassed McLaughlin from

company property, disconnected his telephone extension and email
and refused to provide him with employment references.
Cookietree and Schenk then reduced McLaughlin's severance
10

payments (to which he was contractually entitled) to 1992
levels.

These actions were intended to place McLaughlin in

financial difficulty so he would give up his shareholder rights
under the 1991 and 1999 Shareholder. Agreements.
45.

These actions were in direct retaliation for

McLaughlin's exercise of his shareholder rights.

The

termination was intended to harm McLaughlin economically, force
him to accept the sale of Cookietree to Otis (and sign a noncompete with them) and give up his shareholders rights,
Employment Agreement rights and forgive Cookietree and Schenk's
violations of fiduciary duty.
46.

Immediately after McLaughlin's termination, Cookietree

and Schenk told McLaughlin they would only consider a "global
resolution" in which McLaughlin would resolve his Employment
Agreement rights in connection with his previously asserted
shareholder rights.
47.

McLaughlin declined to "globally resolve" his claims

and sued.
48.

In April 2005, Cookietree's Board of Directors,

consisting of Harold Rosemann, Gayle Schenk and Greg Schenk held
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a regularly noticed and scheduled board meeting.

Nothing about

the 1999 transaction was considered or discussed.
49.

In May 2005, on the advice of litigation counsel,

Cookietree's Board of Directors held another meeting for which
no notice was given.

The Board and each of them voted to ratify

the 1999 transaction and waive the requirements of the 1991
Shareholder's Agreement.
50.

At the time of the May 2005 Board meeting, the 1991

Shareholder's Agreement was no longer in force or effect.
51.

The two Schenks and Mr. Rosemann, by their own

testimony, agreed to the waiver and ratification because "it
followed Boyd Schenk's wishes." None of the directors can
identify a corporate purpose for the waiver and ratification.
Rather, the motivations were characterized by self-interest,
financial gain and retaliation against McLaughlin.
52.

At the time of the waiver and ratification, Boyd

Schenk had been dead for six and one-half (6 H) years.
53.

Directors Gayle Schenk and Greg Schenk, husband and

wife, benefited personally from the waiver and ratification.
The value of Cookietree stock had increased over the six (6)
years Greg owned it.

They received six years of significant
12

corporate dividends and in the future will continue to receive
dividends.
54.

Director Harold Roseman also had a conflicting

interest in the transaction.

He is an at-will employee of

Cookietree, Inc. subject to termination if he does not agree
with Greg Schenk.

He personally was awarded the opportunity to

buy Cookietree stock at the time of the 1999 stock; a
transaction in which he was necessarily complicitious as
Secretary of the Board.
CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty)
55.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 54

above as if fully set forth herein.
56.

Cookietree is a close corporation. Greg Schenk was the

majority shareholder, CEO and President of the Board.
Gayle, was a member of the Board.

His wife,

The third Board member,

Harold Rosemann was also a shareholder and the company CFO,
employed at will.

McLaughlin was a minority shareholder and

employee.
57.

By operation of law, fiduciary duties existed among

and between the Schenks, Rosemann and McLaughlin.
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a.

The shareholders of a close corporation share a
fiduciary relationship which imposes upon all
shareholders the duty to act in good faith and
fairness with regard to their respective
interests as shareholders.

b.

Officers and directors owe a fiduciary duty to
the company and to minority shareholders. Among
the many aspects of this duty, directors owe the
shareholders a duty not to favor one shareholder
over another.

58.

Officers and directors of a corporation are personally

liable for torts of the corporation or of its other officers and
agents if they participate in the wrongful activity.
59.

The two Schenks and Rosemann used their positions with

the corporation and used the corporation for the purpose of
promoting personal interest at the expense of another
shareholder.
60.

In May, 2005 Gayle .Schenk, Greg Schenk and Harold

Rosemann and each of the personally participated in the breaches
of fiduciary duty committed agaist McLaughlin when they ratified
and waived a transaction in which they had a personal interest.
14

61.

Defendants' conduct toward McLaughlin was a breach of

fiduciary duty, not in the best interest of the corporation and
motivated by self-interest and malice.
62.

McLaughlin has been damaged by Defendants' breaches of

63.

McLaughlin was unable to acquire his pro rata share of

duty.

Cookietree stock at the time of the 1999 transaction.

He has

been deprived of the appreciated value of those shares over
eight (8) years and past and future dividends from those
additional shares.
64.

As further items of damage, McLaughlin was frozen out

of the company, terminated, had his severance cut and put on the
street without notice, resulting in lost wages and income.
These actions were taken in direct retaliation for his challenge
of the 1999 transaction and assertion of shareholder rights to
buy the company and are damages flowing from the breaches of
fiduciary duty.
65.

McLaughlin should be awarded punitive damages as a

result of Defendants' breaches of fiduciary duty.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, McLaughlin prays for Judgment as follows:
1.

For judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against

Defendants in a sum to be determined at trial;
2.

In addition to his actual damages, punitive damages in

an amount to deter Defendants and other individuals similarly
situated from further and similar conduct;
3.

On all causes of action, that Plaintiff recovers his

costs and prejudgment interest;
4.

On all causes of action, that Plaintiff recovers his

attorney's fees;
5.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

just and equitable.
DATED this

3f

day of

May, 2007.

LINCOLN W. HOBBS
MARGARET H. OLSON, Of Counsel
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Plaintiff's address:
3979 Saddleback Road
Park City, UT 84098
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused a trne and correct copy of
the foregoing to be delivered as follows:

KT]
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

Mail
Fax
Fed Ex
Hand Delivery
Personally Served

Matthew M. Durham
Justin E. Palmer
STOEL RIVES, L.L.P.
201 South Main Street, #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Fax No. 578-6999
Attorneys for Defendants
Greg Schenk and Cookietree, Inc.

Mail
Fax
Fed Ex
Hand Delivery
Personally Served

Richard D. Flint
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN
299 South Main Street, #1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Fax No. 521-9639
Attorneys for Defendants Anna
Schenk and Estate of Boyd Schenk

DATED this 3(

day of

mA*U^~)

2007.
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